研究成果報告書
政策・メディア研究科修士1年 グローバルガバナンスプログラム所属
小南のり子
研究課題名「平和構築としての雇用創出とコミュニティの再興」
本研究は、開発援助が如何にして、紛争経験国の復興、その後の長期的な安定と経済成長に寄与すべきか、という点に着目したものであった。平和構築分野の中でも特に、紛争終結後の兵士の社会復帰という分野に焦点を当て、伝統的な開発援助が取り組んでこなかった同分野に対し、援助機関がどのように取り組んでいくべきか、また取り組めるのか、という、より大きな課題に取り組むための足がかりとすることを、本研究の目標の一つとしていた。同研究は理論研究とケーススタディ(主にモザンビーク)から構成されており、以下ではそれぞれの研究を論文として発表することで、研究成果の報告としたい。
1, Can
Military Expenditure Promote Development?
2,
Feature of Insurgency:
Can Military Expenditure
Promote Development?
Noriko
Kominami
Introduction
There
have been both positive and negative views regarding the effect of military
expenditure (milex) on development since the early
1970s. Some previous studies have argued that the milex
can promote development, others reveal completely opposite evidence. In order to
analyse the influence of milex
on development, I will focus on less developed countries (LDCs)
because it is likely that the economic and social factors are different in the
case of LDCs, in contrast to developed countries, and
these two categories should be analysed respectively.
The notion of development is also a debatable concept. But here, I use
development as an improvement of the Human Development Index by United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), because the argument
around the notion is beyond the scope of this essay.
In the
following section, I will review the main studies conduced in the 1970s and 1980s
and briefly, discuss their main features. Secondly, I will discuss the circumstantial
changes of the security sector in the post Cold War era, in contrast to the
period before the end of the Cold War. In addition, I shall evaluate the applicability
of previous work, and suggest an alternative framework for analysis. In the
final section, I will examine the relations between milex
and conflict, which will lead my conclusions.
1,
Previous Studies during 1970s and 1980s
In this section,
I will review some of the fundamental studies dealing with relations between milex and development.
The
attempts to integrate defence studies into economics
started in the early 1960s. One of the biggest contributors during this period
was Mckean (1960), who built the basis of defence-economics by applying concept of economic
efficiency to the defence sector. During the 1970s,
the correlation between milex and economic growth
started to draw attention. Benoit’s empirical study caused an argument
concerning this correlation, which still continues today. In this sense, he is a pioneer,
exploring the basis of milex-development studies. He
observed that the countries with a heavy defence
burden tend to experience rapid growth by evaluating 44 LDCs.
The important finding is that it is more likely that size of the defence burden determines the economic growth rates than vice
versa. The explanation given for this is possibility of modernising
effect of milex on civilian growth rates mainly
through “spin-off”. (Benoit 1973)
Based on
the similar empirical approach to Benoit, however, Deger
took an opposite view. Introducing the concept of ‘economic entitlement’ from Sen (1983) as the indicator of ‘development’, he conducts
complex analyses on internal and external military effects within a
macro-economic framework. What makes his work unique is that he does not regard
the investment level and that of saving as the same. In other words, in LDCs, it depends on the absorbing capacity how much the
saving is converted to investment. He introduces a concept of human capital
formation as a determinant of absorbing capacity, concluding that it seems that
milex has negative effect on economic growth and
‘entitlement’ though he admits that he cannot strongly argue it because the various
determinants are offsetting one another as well as heavily depending on the specific
condition of each country. (Deger 1986)
On the
other hand, Smith deals with this issue from Marxist perspective. By analysing the correlation between the size of milex and the income per
capita, employment and stability, he examines underconsumption
hypothesis that milex is the only way for providing the
solution to economic stagnation under the capitalism. From this analysis, he
claims that the underconsumption hypothesis is
doubtful. Instead, he suggests, high milex could
suppress supply through reducing investment and exports, “causing
balance-of-payments and capacity constraints, while increasing inefficiency in
industry.” The spin-off effect seems to be small, given the gap of technical
level between military and civilian industry. He then concludes that the
justification for expansion of milex in capitalism
might not be given by purely economic reasons but by more political “strategic”
reasons, and that the capitalist countries needs the milex,
which in turn destabilises the system itself through
low growth rate. (Smith 1977, p.70)
However these
early studies pay little attention to the intention and view of developed
countries in terms of development assistance. Deger
takes the development and military assistance into consideration when he
examines the influence of milex on international
economy. But his study was limited in the sense that it only concerns about the
“commercialisation of international armaments
transfers”. (Deger, p.148) In other words, though he
focuses on the desire of military industry in the north to sell military
products to south as well as desire of governments in north to maintain
external financial balance within certain degree to which domestic people can
accept, he never puts this issue into the context of development theory that
influenced donors in the developed countries.
In this
sense, Ball’s work is productive since she focuses on impact of development
theory on assistance given to milex. She argues that
during1950s and 1960s, the ‘trickle down’ theory was dominant in development
theory, which had strong impact on forming “military-as-a modernizer” theory.
Based on this theory, donors tended to regard military as a centre actor, which
in turn contributes nation building, modernization through ‘spin-off’ and
external security. To describe this logic, Ball quotes Guy Pauker
(1959), who strongly maintains necessity of military government for LDCs to achieve development. This theory, which Ball criticises as “oversimplification” is desirable for Western
governments as it offers a justification for them to suppress the left parties
through supporting military in LDCs. She concludes
that this theory lacking empirical facts has been questioned so seriously that
its influence is “currently negligible”. Denying the liberals, she basically
supports what she calls “armament-underdevelopment approach.” (Ball 1988, ch.1)
Overall,
from these previous arguments, it does not seem clear enough to conclude if the
milex can promote development because there are still
debatable, and most of them attribute their conclusion to subtle balance of
variables which depend on the specific social factors in individual countries.
However,
two main points can be observed in the previous studies mentioned above. First,
as we have seen, the literature related to milex and
development during the Cold War is basically divided in two categories
depending on the ideology upon which the studies stand. Ball argues this point
clearly by saying that neither liberals nor armament-underdevelopment radicals
go beyond ideological blind. (Ball 1988, p.5) Fine also points out the gap
between these two approaches. While the liberal critique emphasises
empirical facts in order to draw abstract framework, underconsumptionism
starts their argument from a theory, lacking the mediating links between theory
and empirical observation. (Fine 1993)
Secondly,
both stand on the presumption that the military sector is fundamentally monopolised by the government. Deger
mentions domestic conflict in consideration of determination of the size of the
milex though he does not go in depth to this issue
because it contains political rather than economic nature, and his main concern
is on the economic analysis. From the economic point of view, he claims that
the structural change necessary for the development will bring about domestic
conflicts. What he assumes as the ‘conflict’ here is ‘distributional conflict’
caused by dynamic process of rapid economic growth, for example those caused by
inflation. Then military control can contribute to reduce these conflicts. (Deger 1986, pp.225-230) But he is not likely to assume the
conflicts by multiplicity of actors who have access to small arms. (Muggah 2001, p.71) Thus what he assumes as conflicts is
different from those taking place after the Cold War, and in this sense, it can
still be said that he assumes monopoly of violence by the government.
Bearing
these features of early works in mind, the following sections will discuss if
these previous arguments can provide suitable framework for analysing
milex and development, given the circumstantial changes
after the Cold War.
2, Milex and development in the post Cold War era
First of
all, to tackle this issue, I will identify the main changes in the trend of
conflicts before and after the end of the Cold War.
Change in the nature of the threat
After the
Cold War, so-called ‘peace dividend’ was expected along with reduction of
public resources that had been invested to military and defence
sectors. In fact, milex decreased aftermath of the
Cold War except for
In
addition, the ratio of intrastate armed conflicts against interstate wars has
risen since the end of the Cold War and most of civil wars broke out in the LDCs. For example in 1999, according to SIPRI’s
definition, there were 27 major armed conflicts in 25 countries throughout the
world, and only two of the conflicts were interstate. (SIPRI Yearbooks 2000) Fifteen of the 20 LDCs
in the world have been involved in major civil conflicts during the last 15
years (Mohammed 2000, p.2)
Furthermore,
with increase of regionalised civil wars, and
proliferation of light weapons and small arms, proportion of the civilian
casualties has risen. In short, the boundary between military and civilian has
been blurred. (Gamba and Cornwell 2000)
These
three main features that characterise the post Cold
War period made people recognize that the expected ‘peace dividend’ was
illusion. The fear of interstate war between superpowers was replaced by that
of intrastate war mainly in developing countries.
Analysis of previous works in the current
world
Given
these changes in trends and nature of conflict after the end of the Cold War,
is the framework of previous studies done before and during the Cold War still
valuable? Here, we witness two weaknesses that they contain.
First of
all, in the past, the arguments on economic growth and milex
were based on the assumption that the military sector is mainly dominated by the
governments as discussed in the previous section. Though some mentioned
internal threat, their main concern was still on how the governments should
protect its territory from external threat. This assumption reflected the
international circumstances where fear of outbreak of war between two alliances
was the biggest concern. Considering increasing threat of civil war in the post
Cold War era, however, it can be said that this assumption is not necessarily
true any more. In short, ‘monopoly of violence’ which governments enjoyed until
the end of the 1980s has collapsed since the beginning of 1990s. Muggah describes this phenomenon concisely.
(T)he state is losing its monopoly over the de facto ‘tools’ of violence. But it
should be recalled that forty years of Cold War encouraged the diffusion of
small arms through virtually all layers of society. (Muggah 2001,
p.71)
Specifically, when we look at sub-Saharan
In
addition, the armed conflict became one of the crucial elements when thinking
about economic growth and development. It is no longer an exceptional obstacle hampering
the development process out of blue. Given the condition after the Cold War,
the early approaches, mentioned in the previous section, where traditional
economic analysis is emphasized either through empirical or theoretical measure
are not sufficient because they exclude internal conflict as an external
obstacle. They do not include it as a factor that directly determines the
economic growth and development.
There are
two factors in the background of this second point. One is that the costs of
the armed conflicts are so devastating that “in many cases wars wiped out the
achievements of decades of economic and social development.” The conflict can
affect the economy by wasting “valuable human and material resources”, and by negatively affecting economy either
through the destruction of fundamental social services or through “the
crowding-out effect” of milex which otherwise would
be used for other social services. (Mohammed 2000, pp.4-5) It is little room of
argument regarding this. The armed conflicts obviously affect economy and
development negatively.
But what
also should be noted here as the second factor is that conflict itself has been
recognised as a cause of less development. As Mohammed
points out in his research paper for the World Bank’s Development Economic
Research Group, armed conflict is not only negatively influential on development,
but also considered to be a cause of economic stagnation. (Mohammed 2000)
Similarly, borrowing Holtzman (1999), Muggah maintains that “armed conflict can no longer be
viewed as an externality to development … rather conflict and its aftermath is
one of the key constraints to development and one of the main causes of poverty”.
(Muggah 2001, p.75)
To sum
up, outbreak of conflict is currently seen as the negative obstacle for
development as well as the cause of poverty because conflict deteriorates the
quality and quantity of development assistance, in some cases forcing
development programmes to be cancelled. (Muggah 2001, p.75) Therefore, the outbreak of conflict
should be considered as one of the internal determinants affecting the
development process.
New Framework for analysis of the correlation
between milex and development
As we
have seen, the conflict is a key element of development in the post Cold War.
In practice, this view is currently prevailing among other multilateral
development agencies such as UNDP as well as bilateral donors. (UNDP, 1998) The
trend is supported by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), when DAC
Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation was approved in
1997.
On the
other hand, it seems that milex is closely linked to
the internal conflict since the size of public expenditure on security sector is
likely to have a direct impact on the balance between the defence
power of government and that of its internal threat, that is, guerrillas or
warlords. As Ball explains, the internal security role is the primary function
of military in many developing countries today. (Ball ch.2, ch.10 p.393)
It can
thus be said that conflict and its prevention should be taken into account in
order to analyse the interaction of milex and development. Suppose that achievement of development
process depends on the outbreak of armed conflict, and conflict prevention is
intimately related to security sector, it will be necessary to examine the
correlation between milex and conflict occurrence as
well as its prevention in consideration of milex-development
relation.
3,
Correlation between the milex and the intrastate war
When we
consider the relation between milex and internal
conflict, there are two arguments contradicting each other.
Recently World
Bank and other multilateral as well as bilateral donors tend to assume milex as what should be cut down because heavy burden of
military budget is one of factors causing armed conflicts. Mohammed notes, “(i)ncreases in the level of
military spending are also believed to be a cause for civil wars and armed
conflicts.” The allocation of public expenditure on military sector leads to
‘crowding out’ effect, repressing other social services such as education. The
quality of life then could be deteriorated, making people frustrated.
Eventually the grievance among the poor will bring about violent conflict. (Mohammed
2000, p.11) Similarly, in the report suggesting the role of the European Union
(EU), Chalmers notes “With the end of Cold War rivalry, …donors also raised
concerns at the negative impact of an excessive or misdirected security sector
for domestic governance, becoming less tolerant of the effects of excessive defence spending on the economies of developing countries.”
(Chalmers 2000, p.5) Department for
International Development (DFID) also states in its policy statement that “(e)xcessive or inefficient spending on security pre-empts
resources that could be used for development purposes.” (DFID 2000, p.3)
However, this
argument can be criticized from two perspectives. First, from the macroeconomic
view, the works in early years such as Benoit and Deger
suggest that reducing milex in a given public budget
does not necessary mean that more resource will be allocated to “productive
investment”, for example spending for education, because “extra resources
released may be frittered away on conspicuous consumption” in LDCs. (Deger 1986, p102) Though
these works also have limitation as discussed, this point is not negligible. Secondly,
in terms of security, it is pointed that insufficient budged allocated to
security sector can also be a factor of conflicts. In his study on small arms
and globalisation, Muggah
maintains that criminality will increase when defence
and policing sector is reduced because it creates demobilized soldiers who have
few alternatives to maintain sustainable life, with easy access to diffused
small arms. (Muggah 2001)
This
second point is important because it accurately perceives the features of civil
wars which have occurred during the post Cold War era. In the study on internal
conflict in
To sum
up, the commonly presumed idea among development agencies that milex is harmful to conflict prevention is not necessarily
evident either from economic or security aspects. On the contrary, decrease of military
spending can even be the factor destabilising the
society and leading to a conflict in contemporary developing countries. It can
therefore be said that it is not sufficient, but also dangerous simply to cut
budget for security sector. The important point is to compare the negative
effects coming from excess milex, for example ‘crowding
out effect’ and those coming from arising level of insecurity. In other words,
the task is to minimise negative effect of excess milex, if any, without promoting the potential risk of
outbreak of conflict.
Conclusion
There are
a number of studies examining whether milex promotes
development, mainly by the use of traditional economic approach, specifically
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. However from these previous works, one cannot obtain
a clear answer to this question because the debate is still continuing,
moreover, the variables they used are dependent on other social factors, which
are also changing in each country.
Given the
post Cold War circumstances where the outbreak of internal conflict is the
cause as well as the consequence of economic stagnation, one should take the
risk of conflict into consideration when analysing
the milex-development relation. The potential risk of
conflict can no longer be excluded as an exceptional case of macroeconomic
analysis. Recent trends regarding the impact of milex
on development is generally thought to have produced negative results. However
it should be noted that, at the same time, the decrease of military spending
can destabilise societies, especially where the
shadow of the state is already deteriorating security and where there are plenty
of opportunities enabling ‘societal re-armament’. Thus, to answer the main
question, one must evaluate the balance of the negative effects of excess milex and the potential risk of conflict. In the case of a low
risk of conflict, negative effects of the former will be greater than the
conflict risk enhanced by milex decrease. Here it
could be argued that milex is a negative factor for
development. On the other hand, in the case of a high risk of conflict, the downsizing
of milex might bring about a conflict. In this case,
maintaining or increasing milex can be regarded as a positive
factor for development.
Finally
there is a policy implication that can be drawn in terms of development
assistance. It is dangerous to overemphasize the negative effect of the heavy
burden of milex. When the downsizing of a military
budget is implemented, it should be combined with programmes
for the reform of the security sector, including the police, judicial systems,
small arms control and the reintegration of ex-combatants so that such
reductions of milex does not directly reduce the
level of security.
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Feature of Insurgency:
Noriko Kominami
Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, more
intrastate conflicts than interstate ones can be seen. (SIPRI) Since the early
1990s, the mainstream measure aimed to bring these internal conflicts into
peace settlement has been those which establish the democratic government by
implementing elections.
The previous studies of conflicts in
Bearing these contexts in mind, I will compare features of the conflicts in the two countries, specifically focusing on the nature of guerrillas and the way in which local people have perceived them. This will be argued in the following section by dividing conflicts into three phases. First, I will review the origins of insurgency in the two countries, pointing out their differences. Then common features shared by both cases as well as differences in the process of expansion of insurgency, specifically the way in which the rebels gained support from people, will be discussed. Thirdly, I will analyze both cases in terms of the impacts and results of the insurgency, which will lead to my conclusions.
1, Origins of insurgency
The origins of insurgency in
On the other hand, Liberian society was
initially dominated by the former slaves coming from
It may seem to be oversimplification to say
that Renamo was established by foreigners whereas
NPFL was formed domestically because it is said that at the time of the invasion,
Charles Taylor was unknown to outside
2, Process of gaining the local support
As discussed above, the origins of insurgency were different in both cases. However, when it comes to the factors enhancing the guerrillas, the two cases have much in common. The shared points will be discussed from three aspects in the following.
Political system
First, in terms of the political system,
both cases have a certain circumstantial rationale to strengthen the rebellion.
In
Similarly, in
Economic factors
The frustration regarding economic and
social stagnation among the people was also a factor which promoted them to
accept or support Renamo in
Also in
Religious aspects
Secondly, the contradiction between traditional
beliefs and modern political systems can be pointed out as a factor enhancing
the rebels. The religions related to ancestors can be seen among the majority
of the people of
But what should not be ignored here is that Renamo also manipulated their religious beliefs. It is observed that when they destroyed every building in the communal villages, they left religious symbols such as churches or mosques. They are also known to have rituals which believed to strengthen their authority and guarantee their success. Through these religious rituals, some local residents came to regard the atrocity conducted by Renamo as an “expressions of the ancestors’ united anger over Frelimo’s policies’. Here, Renamo succeeded in avoiding from being blamed for its brutality. (Vines 1996, pp.112-113) It can thus be said that Renamo received at least a passive support from rural population in spite of their brutality by utilizing their religious beliefs.
On the other hand, Ellis argues that
In short, in both cases, there was the tension between the political system introduced recently and the traditional system based on indigenous belief. The two cases share the point that the tension could contribute to offering the condition which promoted people to accept rebels although the way in which it affected them was less similar in each case.
To sum up, when we observe the process in which guerrillas obtained the local support from political, economic and religious aspects, more than a few features shared by Liberian and Mozambican cases can be seen. Although there were, of course, unique features to each case as discussed above, it is obvious that, in both, the rebels, more or less, succeeded in winning the support from general people. In this sense, it is not necessarily true to contrast the two cases because Renamo is merely a puppet, whereas NPFL was local-based group. The differences between them are less clear in the phase of their growth than in the phase the rebels were created.
3, Expansion of the insurgency
There is a significant difference between
the two cases in terms of the consequences of the insurgency, specifically
after the peace negotiation started. While in
Then why did not this kind of split take
place in Mozambican case? The most plausible answer is that Renamo
was not based on a certain ethnic group. They did not obtain the support from
specific ethnicity, and therefore the ethnic rivalries did not penetrate into
broader society. Actually, at the beginning, it was not true. Young suggests that
Renamo was supported by people in Manica
province, in its early days, utilizing their ethnic solidarity and sentiment
against the central government based on
However, it is likely that their ethnic
basis became broader afterwards. Vines describes this process related to the
language used by Renamo combatants. Refering to Shona as N’dau, he admits that originally Renamo
was based on a N’dau elite because
These findings might seem contradictory to
the result of the election because it was NPFL that won 75% of the votes beyond
regional borders, while the people who voted to Renamo
tended to be limited in north-central provinces. (Harris 1999; Africa Research
Bulletin 1994, p.11637; Synge 1997, pp.137-140) Yet,
what caused the results of the election as they were should be considered separately
from the nature of the rebels themselves. As this analysis is beyond the scope
of this essay, I will not argue it in depth. But several factors can be
suggested. First,
In short, the insurgency in both countries,
specifically after the attempt in peace settlement was started, caused
different effect on the transformation of the conflicts. While the belligerents
in
Conclusion
Above, we have discussed the features of
insurgency as well as their change in
In order to understand insurgencies and civil wars, it is important to analyze internal dynamics because the feature of the rebels can change, and then their change can also transform the nature of conflict. Even if the insurgency was initially created by foreigners, the local support is necessary for the insurgency to be expanded. In this sense, it is essential to look closely at the interaction between the rebels and population for comprehending civil wars.
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