gThe Possibility of the Genuine Trust Relation Between Turkey and Greeceh

 

Keisuke Tochio

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

In this essay, as one part of my studying about the stability in the Balkan States, I will analyze the bilateral relation between two major countries in this area, Turkey and Greece. It is clear that all three elements, the regional, the international and bilateral initiative, will be essential for the true stability in this area. On the one hand two elements have tended to be equipped since 1995 when the Dayton Agreement was sined, but on the other hand the bilateral relation is still the obstacle for the true stability. Therefore, it can be said that the present critical necessity is to improve the bilateral relation between Turkey and Greece.

In this context, I will focus on two cumbersome obstacles which prevent the cooperative bilateral relation, the Cyprus Conflict and the Aegean Conflict. Because of these conflicts, only in 1990s two countries went very close to the war at least two times. However in other words, if these conflicts will be solved, there are only small problems which can not prevent the present reconciliatory atmosphere. Therefore, in this essay, I will try to propose soluvable policies about two conflicts, especially the Cyprus Conflict. For this purpose, I will use following three chapters.

In the first chapter, as the precondition of this essay, I will confirm the mutuality between the bilateral relation and the whole stability in this area. In this part, I will put stress on two major countriesf cost and benefit by their contributing the stability of this region.

In the second chapter, I will analyze two cumbersome conflicts, the Cyprus Conflict and the Aegean Conflict. In this part, I will try to insist that the Cyprus Conflict is the main obstacle for both countries than the Aegean one.

At last, I will try to find out the concrete solution for the Cyprus Conflict. In this chapter, I will lead the conclusion by analyzing three choices for it, the federation, the confederation and two independent states.


Chapter.1 The Mutuality between the Regional Stability and the Bilateral Relation

 

              Before discussing about the relation between Turkey and Greece, I must make it clear why this bilateral relation is so important. In this chapter, I will focus on the importance of the mutuality between this bilateral relation and the whole Balkan Statesf stability. For this purpose, I will use following three parts. In the first one, I will focus on the impact of the bilateral relation toward the Balkan Statesf stability. In this part, I will confirm the importance of the bilateral relation toward the whole stability of the Balkan States. In the second part, I will try to assert that the positive effect of the Stability in this region is enormous to these two countries. In this part, I will analyze about the mutuality of them by using two international-politics dimensions. The one is political-economic dimension, which is belonged to the liberalism or the Pluralism, which emphasizes economic activities and non-governmental actors in the world politics. The other is the nation-state politics dimension, which is belonged to the Realism, which emphasizes only inter-governmental factors. And as a conclusion, I will summarize this chapter in the third part.

 

1. The Impact of the Bilateral Relation toward the Regional Stability

              Many authors argued already, the bilateral relation between Turkey and Greece, two major countries in the Balkan State, is one of the most important elements to restore the stability in this region. In this part, I will explain about this fact briefly with following the history of this region after the collapse of the cold war.

              After 1989 when the Balkan States countries could get their own independences, the reconciliatory cooperation atmosphere the gGolden Erah[1] was created. However, on the one hand it was recognized for the good chance for the reconciliation, on the other hand it was composed only by strategical bilateral agreements of friendship and cooperation. So that it mean, even if this Golden Era seemed like the reconciliatory atmosphere, it can be pointed out that this term was just a preparation term for following two axes[2], the one included Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia, the other contained Greece, Serbia and Russia[3].

              As one cause of deteriorated stability in the Balkan States, many authors pointed out the bilateral relation between Turkey and Greece. Especially in the term after the Golden Age until the Dayton Agreement in 1995, two axes which were created by these two major countries were critical for the stability. And by the political aspect or the economical aspect, it was clear that both two countries had initiatives for these axes[4].

              After the Dayton Agreement, in stead of these two axes, the emergence of new efforts to stabilize this region was recognized. These were the international organizationfs one and the EUfs one. A lot of kinds of regional initiatives which were launched by outside actors can be recognized. In fact, they proved the efficiency of their missions in both Bosnia and Kosovo. However, on the other hand, it is criticized that the whole Balkan States tends to over depend on outside actors[5]. For example, in Bosnia who could get 4.5 billion multilateral aids and other bilateral aids, the corruption was deteriorated. As a result of this, the western investor tends to avoid this country. So that, we must recognize that the aid from outside was the just temporary and emergency one. In this sense, rather than the assistance from the outside, the self-governance is essential in this region.

              In the context of the self-governance, the bilateral relation between two major countries is indispensable. As I mentioned already, the strength of these countries were proved by their making two axes during the Yugoslavia Conflict. In the size of the economy, both major countries are superior to others. In the political aspects, both countries have a number of channels toward regional and international organizations. Therefore, it can be said that the possibility of their contribution toward the stability of this region has the key for the true success.

 

2. The Cost-Benefit Analysis about the Unstable Region

              As I mentioned above, the impact of the bilateral relation between two major countries in this region is enormous toward the Stability of the Balkan States. However, if the benefit of the stability is not bigger than the cost of it, it is not possible to make two countries go to the stability efforts. Therefore, in this part, I will try to assert that the benefit from the stability is bigger than the cost by two political perspectives, one is the liberalism or pluralism aspect which puts stress on economic activities and non-governmental actors, the other is the realist aspect which emphasizes the inter-governmental actors.

              Firstly, from the political dimension of the pluralism or the liberalism, it is clear that the benefit of the stability is much bigger than the cost. As I mentioned already, in the size of the economy, both countries are superior to others. In other words, this means both of them are dependent upon the world economy heavily[6]. Therefore, the damage of conflicts toward the economy is disastrous. According to the IMF and the World Bank[7], the only direct damage of the Kosovo crisis which much smaller than the Yugoslavia conflict was estimated too high for all countries which also contain Europe. In addition, this research added that the indirect impact which included the immigration, the financial instability and other problems would be enormous too. Therefore, by the liberalism and pluralism point of view, it can be said that the cost of conflicts was too enormous for Turkey and Greece who depend on the world trade.

              Secondly, from the political dimension of the realism, it can be also said that the present unstable situation is not beneficial, but costly for both countries. In this realism analysis, I picked up the Kurd problem, as one of the most difficult problems for Turkey. For example, as one of high priority problems[8], Turkey tries to solve the PKK terrorist problem. However, because Syria has the water problem and the Israel problem with Turkey, she supports unstable elements in Turkey. At the same time Greece also

 

supports Syria and the PKK[9], because she has two big problems with Turkey. And then, Russia tries to expand her effect in this area too, by using antagonism between Turkey and Orthodox Christian countries, Greece, Bulgaria and Armenia. So that, even now, for solving one problem, Turkey must get against most of countries in this region. Additionally, this effort for solving one problem set fire to other problems. As I mentioned many times, one cause of the unstable situation in the Balkan States was the antagonism between Turkey and Greece. Hence the present situation is so costly for both countries, especially for Turkey. Therefore for solving other problems that each country has, it will be beneficial for them to contribute the stability in this region.

             

3. The Importance of the Cooperation between Two Major Regional Countries

              In this chapter, I tried to confirm the deep mutuality between the regional stability and the bilateral relation. In the first part, the certain impact of the bilateral relation between Turkey and Greece toward the regional stability was recognized. In the second part, I could describe the stability in this region is desirable for these two countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that the positive bilateral relation between Turkey and Greece will be fruitful for both the regional stability and both countriesf benefits.


Chapter 2 Conflicts and the Present Conciliatory Atmosphere in Two Countries

             

              In this chapter, I will set two objectives for the following chapters. The firs one is to emphasize the importance of the Cyprus conflict than the Aegean conflict. The second one is to put stress on the present conciliatory atmosphere which is desirable for solving the Cyprus Conflict. For these objectives, I will use three parts in this chapter. In the first one, I will explain about two conflicts briefly. In the second one, I will analyze some elements of these two conflicts for emphasizing the Cyprus Conflict. In the third one, as one good factor for solving the Cyprus Conflict, I will explain about the present situation between two countries with some concrete cooperation.

 

1.     Two Difficult Conflicts, gthe Cyprus Conflicth and gAegean Sea Conflicth

As I mentioned above, the bilateral relation between Turkey and Greece is the essential element for the stability of the Balkan States. However, although these countries were interested in this regionfs situation very much, the effect from this bilateral relation was generally negative for this region. The reason why this bilateral relation gave only negative effects was in these two countriesf antagonism. Especially after 1974, these two countries went to very close to the war 5 times at least. These kinds of distrust relation which escalated two countriesf antagonism gave the negative effect to the stability process of this region. Therefore, for giving positive effects from this bilateral relation, it is necessary to improve the bilateral relation between them.

As critical causes of the antagonism between them, two conflicts, gthe Cyprus conflicth and hthe Aegean conflicth, can be recognized. These cumbersome conflicts deteriorated their bilateral relation.

The Cyprus conflict has been one of the most difficult problems for both since 1960, when the Cyprus was independent from the Great Britain. Although both Turkey and Greece went close to the war only twice about this conflict, it always has the dangerousness toward the war. In general, although the Cyprus Conflict was the outside problem for both Turkey and Greece, they were involved in the establishment of Cyprus too deeply from the beginning. As a result of the Zurich-London accord which recognized the independence of Cyprus, the 1960 constitution was enacted in Cyprus. In Cyprus, they tried to establish the Federation State in which both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could share same rights by this constitution. However, because both this accord and the 1960 constitution was the product of the compromise mainly between Turkey and Greece, the governance under it was collapsed on 1963[10].@In addition, the situation was more confused by Turkeyfs intervention to Cyprus in 1974[11]. After that, by Turkish Cypriotsf sidefs declaration of independence in 1975 and 1983(Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus[12]), both sides have had few chances to reconcile. Recently, in 1997, because of the Greek Cypriotsf sidefs applying to the EU, the tension was restrained again between Turkey and Greece[13]. Although attempts for reconciliation of Cyprus were done mainly by the United Nation and the U.S.A., the agreement point was not found out yet.

About the Aegean Sea Conflict, both Turkey and Greece went very close to the war three times, in 1976, 1987, 1996. Compared with the Cyprus Conflict, the Aegean Conflict is the inside problem between Turkey and Greece. This problem was occurred as a real conflict in 1974. Before 1974, the sea border in the Aegean Sea, which has a number of small Greecefs islands, was already the problem for them since 1958 when the sea border convention was enacted[14]. However, mainly because Greece discovered the oil resource in the Aegean Sea in 1973 when Arabic countries continued the oil embargo, the Aegean problem leaded the real conflict. In addition, because the new law about the sea border was enacted in 1982, both countries went close to the war again. In general, especially after the second crisis, it is said that the main cause is the dominant proportion of Greecefs sea territory. According to the 1982fs new convention, the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Turkey has to pass Greecefs territory whenever Turkey wanted to go out the Mediterranean Sea[15]. Even now, both countries can not find out the compromise.

As a whole, these two conflicts not only prevent the effective cooperation, but also deteriorated the distrust relation between Turkey and Greece. Therefore, firstly it will be necessary for them to overcome these two conflicts.

 

2.     The Analysis about the Relation between Both Conflicts

As I mentioned above, it is clear that these two conflicts are critical for them. However, these two problems were related each other from the beginning. In addition, from one view point it can be said that they were not just related, but also they shaped one center-periphery relation in which the Cyprus Conflict occupied the central position. In this part, I will prove this theory by analyzing some critical points of the Aegean Conflict. In concrete, I will show that the Aegean Sea Conflict was leaded by the Cyprus Conflict by using two analysis methods, the chronological and the issue-oriented analysis.

Firstly by analyzing the chronological aspects of two conflicts, it can be thought that the Aegean Sea Conflict was occurred by the extreme tension of the Cyprus Conflict. The first crisis of the Aegean Sea Conflict was occurred in 1976, this time was fitted just 2 years after Turkeyfs occupation in the Cyprus. As Moustakis pointed out in his article, at that time Greece was so sensitive for Turkeyfs expansionism because of 1974 her occupation[16]. At the same time, the same analysis can be done in Turkeyfs occupation in the Cyprus Conflict context[17]. So that, both conflicts were related, but mainly the Cyprus Conflict leaded the Aegean Sea Conflict in 1970s. The same analyzing can be done in 1983fs second crisis in the Aegean Sea Conflict. 1987 was just three years after the declaration of the TRNC in Cyprus. So that, it is clear that the distrust atmosphere of the Cyprus Conflict set fire to the Aegean Sea Conflict with the 1982 new sea border law. At last, the last crisis of the Aegean Sea Conflict in 1996 was also leaded by the Cyprus Conflict. The timing of this crisis was fitted with Cyprus declaration as EU candidates, and just after Turkeyfs against air force training near Cyprus. So that, it can be said that in general the crisis of the Aegean Sea Conflict was occurred after deteriorating the distrust relation between both countries, because of the Cyprus Conflict.

Secondly, I will try to assert that the importance of the Aegean Sea Conflict tends to be decreased, by using the issue-oriented analysis. Generally in addition to factors of the Cyprus Conflict, this conflict was leaded by two direct causes, the transport method problem and the oil resource problem. Firstly, this conflict was leaded by the transport methods problem, especially for Turkey, because 1982 law meant that Turkey could not go to the Mediterranean Sea without passing Greece territory. The meaning of this problem is still critical as well as in 1982. However the second problem, the oil problem, is not so critical at present. As I mentioned already, the direct trigger of this conflict was Greecefs discovery of the oil resource in the Aegean Sea. At that time when was just after the oil crisis, the oil resource had the critical meaning for both countires. However, at present the importance of the oil resource is relatively small. Firstly, the new oil supply countries, Kavkaz and Central Asian countries, were emerged after the collapse of the cold war. Secondly, the alternative energy resource has been developed since the late of 1980s[18]. So that, one of two importance of the Aegean Sea Conflict is almost disappeared.

              Compared with the Aegean Sea Conflict, the importance of the Cyprus Conflict has been increased in both physical and mental sense. Bahçeri separted mental impacts of it along with two chronological aspects, the term from 1963 to 1974 and the term after 1974. According to his analysis, the former term became the trauma for Turkish Cypriots, because in this term the discrimination toward them were expanded by denying most of their rights which were recognized in 1960fs constitution. However, on the other hand, 1974 Turkeyfs intervention leaded disastrous Greek Cypriotsf death. Both sides of Cyprus can not demise this trauma yet. The physical aspect is more significant. Firstly, at present, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots are completely separated the north and the south. Secondly, during 30 years separation, the economy gap grew enormous between both sides[19]. In addition, both by Turkish Cypriots sidefs declaration of independence TRNC and Greek Cypriots sidefs declaration toward the EU, the political integration became to be more difficult. At last, the immigration in the Turkish Cypriotsf side from Turkey became the problem not only for the Greek Cypriot side, but also for the Turkish Cypriotsf side[20].

              So that, from beginnings of both conflicts, the center of gravity about the relation between two conflicts was existed in the Cyprus Conflict. In addition, recently the gap of the balance tends to be increased.

 

3.     The Present Reconciliatory Atmosphere

As I mentioned already, these two conflicts are critical obstacles for establishing the true trust relation between Turkey and Greece. However in spite of these two problems, the conciliatory atmosphere tends to be created between them. In addition, this atmosphere does not only help making trust relation, but also have the possibility for solving the Cyprus Conflict. Therefore in this part, I will confirm that the present conciliatory atmosphere is beneficial for solving two conflicts, especially the Cyprus Conflict, by analyzing the bilateral relation.

Firstly, I will clarify the history process of this bilateral relation. In this part, I will set g1997h as the important turning point for it. In general, although it is said that the 1999fs disastrous earthquake was the turning point, according to my studying it was just one event to accelerate it.

Before 1997, the reconciliatory atmosphere could not be recognized. As evidences of this distrust relation, I will employ two elements, two crises during 1997 and the diplomacy of both countries about Turkeyfs candidacy for the EU. Firstly, as I mentioned already, only in 1997 both two countries went very neat to the war twice because of two conflicts. This is the first symbol of their distrust relation. Secondly, at the same time, both countriesf diplomacy lacked the cooperativeness. As one critical diplomacy, the EU candidate negotiation should be focused on. As the EUfs future direction of her expansion policy, the gAgenda 2000h was declared in 1997. However in spite of Cyprusfs candidacy which Turkey got against strongly, the name of Turkey could not be found out in the list of candidates. The one critical reason was the strong opposition from Greece.

              However, after 1997 the diplomatic relation between them was changed completely. Although both countriesf positions about two conflicts were rigid, the diplomatic relation about Turkeyfs candidacy for the EU was changed dramatically. After 1997, Greece became to make her diplomatic position change slowly, and at last this change leaded the 1999fs Helsinki EU Summit which added Turkey as the candidate. It is pointed out that this Summit was caused mainly by Greecefs changing her diplomacy toward Turkey[21]. After this critical event, a number of projects for both countries were launched already. Although these were initiated by various kinds of institutions, the EUfs position was striking[22]. At the same time, these projects also expanded to the cultural and mental project which will hold the football festival European Championship in both countries at the same time. In addition, at present this conciliatory atmosphere leads the face to face meeting about the Cyprus Conflict. So that, this conciliatory atmosphere will be able to accelerate the construction of the trust bilateral relation, but only if both cumbersome conflicts, the Cyprus Conflict and the Aegean Conflict, will be solved.

              Secondly, I will confirm that this atmosphere is toward genuine trust relation. In spite of crises between them, also in old ages conciliation atmosphere was sometime created. However, most of them depended only on bilateral political efforts. Therefore, their relation was broken by external elements[23]. Compared with these previous attempts, the present atmosphere tends to be created by all three elements which are essential for the regional stability, international organizations, regional organizations and bilateral relation. Above all, the role of the EU is critical. As I explained already, it is worth noting that the EU tries to create physical networks beyond the border, that was lacked in previous conciliatory atmosphere.

              Therefore, it can be said that although two conflicts are obstacle for them, the present reconciliatory atmosphere which was never appeared before has the possibility for realizing the genuine trust relation between them. And in other words, only at present it is possible to solve their cumbersome conflict problems by using the present atmosphere


Chapter 3 Toward the Genuine Trust

 

              From previous two chapters, two facts can be recognized. The first one is that two conflicts, especially the Cyprus Conflict, are most cumbersome obstacles for the genuine trust relation for both countries. The second one is that the present reconciliatory atmosphere which was never emerged before has the possibility toward the genuine trust relation between them. Therefore, in this chapter I will try to propose concrete policies for solving the Cyprus Conflict by analyzing future governance style in this island. For this purpose, I will set three strategies. Firstly, I will analyze some choices of the governance style in Cyprus. Secondly, I will confirm the present situation of Cyprus which includes the international environment. At last, I will propose the most proper solution for this island.

 

1.     Three Choices for Solving the Cyprus Conflict

In general, three governance styles are proposed as choices for solving the Cyprus Conflict, the independent sate style, the federation style and the confederation style. The difference of them is dependent upon the degree of the integration. In this part, I will explain about them briefly.

              Firstly, the independent state style is the most desirable for TRNC[24]. It means to establish two independent nation states, Cyprus and TRNC, in this island. Generally, these two states will be divided belong with the solid national border, and the freedom of three elements, the capital, goods and people, will not come true.

              Secondly, the federation style is relatively desirable for Cyprus. It means to establish one nation in Cyprus, but inside two sates, Greek Cypriotsf side and Turkish Cypriotsf side, can be existed. However because under the federation governance, the strong central institution will be established, both two sides can not enjoy their broad autonomous. According to Heywood[25], the historical similarity is emphasized as the essential element for the federation. In general, the freedom of three elements will be attained almost completely under the federation.

              Thirdly, the confederation style can be said the compromise between previous two governance styles. This style means to establish one nation in Cyprus, but recognize two statesf autonomous almost as well as the independent nation state. The definition of the confederation is ambiguity, it is appropriate from most of intergovernmental organizations to the Continental Congress which was the origin of the U.S.A.. Under this governance, the freedom of three elements will depend on the negotiation between both sides.

 

2.     The Possible Governance Style in Cyprus

Although in theory three choices are proposed to the Cyprus Conflict, in practice the choice for solving it is limited only to the confederation style. In this part, I will explain why the choice is limited by four aspects, the economical, the political, the geographical and the international environmental one.

Firstly, from the political aspect, on the one hand the Greek Cypriotsf side wishes the federation, but on the other hand the Turkish Cypriotsf side wishes the independent state style. The reason is related the proportion of Cyprusfs population. Because basically the strong central institution has the ability to decide most of critical issues under the federation style, the Turkish Cypriotsf side which has only 24% of population will have to always have the dangerousness to lose the decision making process, even if the unanimity right will be recognized.[26].

              Secondly, from the economical aspect, positions of both sides are more complicated. For the Greek Cypriotsf side, they can stand on the advantageous position. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriotsf side whose GDP per capita is a third of the Greek Cypriotsf sidefs one will suffer from the gap between them. However at the same time, the economic integration means that the Turkish Cypriotsf side will join the EU with the Greek Cypriotsf side. In other words, the Turkish Cypriotsf side will get the tremendous assist from the EU. It is very attractive for the Turkish Cypriotsf side whose GDP is deponent on Turkey over 20%[27]. So that although the economical position of the Turkish Cypriotsf side has the dangerousness of overwhelming by the integration, the possibility of the fruitful result is also exited.

              Thirdly, from the geographical aspect, the federation style will be impossible. As I mentioned at the previous chapter, 40% of all population in the Turkish Cypriotsf side is the immigration from Turkey. In addition, Turkish and Greek Cypriots are divided completely into two sides. These mean that the most essential element for the federation, the similarity of the historical identity, is lacked. To make matters worse, instead of the similarity, the historical trauma makes the federation more difficult.

              At last, in spite of all elements which prevent the integration, the international environment is positive for the integration. As I mentioned in the economic aspect, the Turkish Cypriotsf side tends to be the too heavy burden for Turkey. In the political meaning, this burden will deteriorate Turkeyfs accession toward the EU, if the negotiation of the Cyprus Conflict will be failed[28]. In addition, it means that all Turkeyfs relations with Europe will be deteriorated by this. In addition, it has a positive impact to the real solution that most of major actors in the global politics, which include even Russia[29], want the solution of the Cyprus Conflict. Before the first half of 1990s, only the U.S.A. and the U.N were major actors for solving this problem. Therefore, the possibility that the Turkish Cypriotsf side will be recognized as an independent nation state is extremely weak.

              As a conclusion, both the federation which the Greek Cypriotsf side wants and the independent nation style that the Turkish Cypriotsf side wants will be impossible in practice. So that, both side must find out the agreement point in the confederation style which has flexible choices in detailed points.

 

3.     The Most Appropriate Policy for Cyprus

As I mentioned at the previous part, the agreement point can be thought in the confederation governance style. Therefore in this part, I will think about detailed governance of Cyprus under the confederation and the negotiation toward that. Above all, for this purpose I will focus on problems which will be occurred by the freedom of three elements, the capital, goods and people.

Before thinking about detailed features of the confederation in Cyprus, I will confirm each sidefs preposition toward the negotiation. As I analyzed already, the Greek Cypriotsf side is defined to be active for the federation governance. Therefore, in this analysis the Greek Cypriotsf side wants to realize the complete freedom of three elements. On the contrary, the Turkish Cypriotsf side is complicated. This side wants to attain almost the independence sate elements, so that it will try to get against the freedom of three elements. However at the same time, the Turkish Cypriotsf side will try to gain the economical benefit from the integration. At last, in this part I will mainly put stress on both sidefs initiatives, not international actorfs one, because the most essential element for the solution for any conflicts is the involvement of actors concerned[30]. In followings, I will try to set the proper confederation governance by using previous definitions.

Firstly, in the political aspect, the governing institution which governs whole Cyprus will be relatively loose and flexible. Probably, this central institution will decide only a few common decisions, and the broad autonomous right will be granted to both sides. In this sense, it is said that the proper model will be Montenegro or Quebec[31]. However the most cumbersome problem will be the veto right for common decisions. In this point, the Turkish Cypriotsf side will have to find out the compromise point, instead of some rights that the Greek Cypriotsf wants, because this right will be indispensable for the Turkish Cypriotsf side.

Secondly, in the economical aspect, the problem will be the degree of the freedom of three elements. Compared with the Greek Cypriotsf side who wants all of them, the Turkish Cypriotsf side wants the proper degree of the freedom of two elements, the capital and goods, but not people. If all of them will be opened suddenly, the Turkish Cypriotsf side will be overwhelming by the Greek Cypriotsf side, Because of the big economy gap. Therefore, for protecting peoplefs daily life, the freedom of people will be

 

protected at least[32]. However, because the external economic activity will be necessary for the Turkish Cypriotsf side, other two elements will be opened with the proper speed. In these conditions, they will have to find out the compromise.

As whole, in these elements, I put the stress on the Turkish Cypriots sidefs priorities, because they will be a minority in Cyprus. In addition to this, it is also one reason that the Greek Cypriots is relatively positive for the future integration. However, even if these conditions are true, the Turkish Cypriotsf side should prepare something to sacrifice to the Greek Cypriotsf side, especially for the guaranteed veto right. In this context, she has two options, the speed of the openness in two economic freedoms, and the cession of her territory to the Greek Cypriotsf side. As I mentioned already, the Greek Cypriotsf side wants the Turkish Cypriotsf side to open her economy as soon as possible. In this sense, the Turkish Cypriotsf side will be able to negotiate with the Greek Cypriotsf side. At the same time, the cession of territory will be more efficient. Because the broad autonomous right will be guaranteed under the confederation, the proportion of each territory will have the critical importance to both sides. Above all, compared with the population of the Greek Cypriotsf side, 76% of all Cyprus, the proportion of her territory is relatively small, 70%. Therefore, the Greek Cypriotsf side wishes the territory more than other rights. This kind of ideas was tried already in 1992 when the UN tried to solve this conflict under Ghalifs initiative, but in vain. However, at present when most of factors in the international politics are positive for the solution, this idea in which I added the openness speed of the economy should be revised and discussed in more detailed.


Conclusion

 

              In this essay, as one part of my studying about the cooperation for the stability in the Balkan States, I focused on the bilateral relation between Turkey and Greece, especially about problems which prevents this bilateral relation. In this essay I could find out that in spite of the reconciliatory atmosphere between them, the two conflicts, the Aegean Conflict and the Cyprus Conflict, are still cumbersome obstacles for the bilateral relation. In addition, it was clarified that the importance of the Cyprus Conflict was heavier that the Aegean one. Therefore, for improving the bilateral relation, I tried to propose concrete policies toward the solution.

              It is clear that the solution for the Cyprus Conflict will lead the genuine trust relation between Turkey and Greece. In fact, the face to face concentration negotiation was started from January 2002, and it is ongoing now too. However, in spite of the UN secretariat Annanfs visit to Cyprus, both sides are still reluctant for the integration. Above all the Turkish Cypriotsf side is still insisting two independent states solution. It is caused by attitudes of both Turkey and Greece who are related deeply with this conflict. In concrete, although they have the ability to push each side to the reconciliation, they did not do that yet. More precisely, they could not do that, because they have bitter trauma of 1960fs constitution. However at present, for breaking through this deadlock, the certain momentum is necessary. In this context, the key for the success for the Cyprus Conflict and the genuine trust between Turkey and Greece is how both countries can act toward the solution. And only if the solution will come to Cyprus, at the same time the genuine trust relation between Turkey and Greece will come true.


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17.  Macgregor, Douglas A. (Winter 2001) gThe Balkan limits to power and principleh, Orbis, Vol.45, No.1, p.93-110

18.  Glenny, Misha. (Autumn 2000) gHas anyone seen our policy?h, Washington Quarterly, Vol.23, No.4, p.171-176

19.  Karamanlins, Kostas. (Spring 2000) gGreece: the EUfs anchor of stability in a troubled regionh, Washington Quarterly, Vol.23, No.2, p.7-11

20.  Tsoukalis, Loukas. (Spring 1999) gGreece: like any other European country?.h, National Interest No. 55, pp65-74

21.  Turan, Ilter; Barlas, Dilek. (Winter 1998) gTurkish-Greek balance: a key to peace and cooperation in the Balkans.h, East European Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 4, pp469-488

22.  Panpadereou, George. gDebalkanize the Balkans. (Winter 2001) h, New Perspectives Quarterly Vol. 18 No. 1, pp43-46

23.  Bildt, Carl. (Jan./Feb. 2001) gA second chance in the Balkans.h, Foreign Affairs Vol. 80 No. 1, pp148-158

24.  Bugajski, Janusz. (Autumn 2000) gBalkan in dependence?.h, Washington Quarterly Vol. 23 No.4, pp177-192

25.  Steil, Benn.; Woodward, Susan L. (Nov./Dec. 1999) gA Europe gnew deal h for the Balkans.h, Foreign Affairs Vol.78 No. 6, pp95-105

26.  Kondonis, Haralambos. (Fall 1998) gProspects for Balkan cooperation after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.h, East Europe Quarterly Vol. 32, No.3, pp377-394

27.  Nicole, Watts.(1999), gAllies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-1994h, International Journal of Middle East Studies, pp631-656

Documents

1.      gThe Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: An Updated Assessmenth,  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND repared by staff of the International Monetary Fund in consultation with the World Bank staff Approved by Michael C. Deppler and G. Russell Kincaid,  May 25, 1999

2.      gTHE ROAD TO STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: A REGIONAL STRATEGY PAPERh, Europe and Central Asia Region The World Bank, March 1, 2000

3.      g2001 REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEYfS PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSIONh, European Commission, Nov 31, 2001

4.      gTurkey and the EUh, EUROSTAT reported by TimAllen, May 2000

5.      gTrans European Transport Network 14 priority projects, project 7 Greek Motorwayh, European Commission, 1998

 

HP references

1.      Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative; http://www.unece.org/seci/Welcome.html

2.      Economic Reconstruction And Development in South East Europe;  http://www.seerecon.org/

3.      Representation of the European Commission in Turkey; http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/@

4.      Balkan Task Force; http://www.grid.unep.ch/btf/

5.      Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey; http://www.mfa.gov.tr/

6.      United Nation Economic Commission for Europe; http://www.unece.org/

7.      The EU Home Page about the enlargement toward Turkey;

                                                        http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/index.htm

8.      TINA Home Page; http://www.tinavienna.at/



[1] Kondonis, Haralambos(1998) called the regional cooperative term from 1989 to 1991 the gGolden Erah.

[2] Turan, Ilter(1998) indicated, during this era the base of following two axes was prepared.

[3] Kondonis, Haralambos(1998) pointed out that there were two axis before 1995. One included Greece, Serbia and Russia. The other include Turkey, Albania and Bulgaria. In addition as evidence of these axes, they pointed out that Turkey was the first country who recognize Macedonia during Greecefs complaining.

[4] As evidences of their initiatives, Turan(1998) described about the fact that Serbian regime could get supplies from Greece despite the UN declared embargo.

[5] Bugajski, Janusz(2000), Bildt, Carl(2000), Steil, Benn(1999) criticized the present over- dependent situation in the Balkan States. In addition, they even assert this situation was one of causes which made their reforms delay.

[6] For example, the trade proportion of whole GDP increases steadily in both countries. In Turkey, the rate of proportion changes from 30% in 1990 to over 50% in 1999(World Bank Data, gWorld Development Indicator 2000h).

[7] The IMF and The World Bank(1999), tried to estimate the cost of the Kosovo Conflict. In this paper, the direct damage to especially the Balkan States was estimated.

[8] Nicole Watts(1999) pointed out that especially after 1980s the Kurdish problem became to rise.

[9] Kotzias, Konstantinos(2000) pointed out, in spite of the reconciliatory atmosphere between Turkey and Greece, the 1999fs problem of Ocalan who was the leader of the PKK almost leaded the crisis again.

[10] Bahçeri,Tozun(2000) pointed out the luck of the self-governace, as one critical factor for the Cyprus Conflict. In detail, this 1960 constitution enacted the Turkish Cypriotsf right broadly. However, especially the veto right of the Turkish Cypriots was the problem for the Greek Cypriots.

[11] According to Kurop, Marcia(1998), after 1974fs intervention, about 35,000 troops occupied about northern 30 % of this island.

[12] The TRNC is recognized officially only by the Republic of Turkey.

[13] Berletta, Michael(1998) described the 1997fs tension which was caused by the supply of the s-300 missile system from Russia.

[14] Moustakis, Fotis(1998) indicated that in 1958, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was enacted. It indicated all countries that the sea border is limited 6 miles from each countryfs shelves.

[15] Moustakis, Fotis(1998) explained that this new law changed Turkeyfs sea territory in the Aegean Sea from 35% to 9% of all, but Greecefs one was increased to 64% of all.

[16] Moustakis, Fotis(1998).

[17] Bahçeri, Risopolous(1996, 2000) pointed out, the 1974 Turkeyfs occupation was leaded by the revision of Greecefs enosis.

[18] Thomas, Victoria(1999) pointed out that Turkeyfs energy network will depend on Kavkaz and Central Asian countries. At the same time, he described Turkeyfs demand for natural gas(LPG) will be increased dramatically in 2010s.

[19] Economic Intelligence Country Report, Cyprus(1998) pointed out, on the one hand the Greek Cypriot side attained the GDP/capita about $13,000, but on the other hand the Turkish Cypriot sidefs GDP/capita was just $4158.

[20] According to Bahçeri(2000), about 40% of TRNC is the immigration from Turkey.

[21] The Foreign Minister of Greece Papandreou(2001) described that this changing was dependent upon Greecefs conciliatory position toward Turkey. At the same time, Karamanlis(2000) Hope(2001) and Turan(1998) insist this event was one of evidences that Greece changed her diplomacy toward Turkey.

[22] The EU tries to construct infrastructure networks which are beyond both countriesf border, they are transport, energy and telecommunication. They are initiated by TENs(Trans European Netwroks), but at the same time various kinds of funds is used for this construction. More detailed information is available in the EUfs TENs HP, Regional Policyfs HP and articles which are listed in the bibliography. 

[23] For example, Barletta,Michael(1998) insist that the crisis in 1997 which was occurred by the Cyprus Conflict was accelerated by international environment.

[24] TRNC declared her independence in 1983, but recognized only by Turkey. Therefore, the both economical and political external relation was limited only with Turkey.

[25] Heywood, Andrew(1997), POLITICS, pp127

[26] Bahçeri, Tozun(1996,2000)described that in fact in 1960s when the Greek Cypriots side wanted to stop or decrease Turkish Cypriotsf rights, they could do that by using their dominant proportion of the parliament.

[27] gThe Denktash Dilemma OPINION: By Christodoulos G. Pelaghiash, CYAD, 29, May, 2002

[28] According to Bahçeri, Tozun(2000), Turkey already declared that she will annex the Turkish Cypriotsf side, if only the Greek Cypriotsf side will join the EU. It is said that Turkey will never be a EU memberstate, if the negotiation will be failed.

[29] Barletta, Michael(1998) described that the 1997fs crisis in Cyprus was partly caused by Russia who wants to make faint the NATOfs expansion toward former Sovietfs countries.

[30] Most of articles about the Cyprus Conflict, Kurop,Marcia(1998), Black, Jan(2001), Bahçeri, Tozun(1996, 2000) pointed out that the origin of this conflict was caused mainly by not involvement of both sides into the 1960 constitution. In addition, about the whole Balkan Conflict, Macgregor, Douglas(2001), Steil, Benn(1999), Bildt, Carl(2001), Bugajski, Janusz(2000) pointed out the importance of the self governance for the true stability. 

[31] Bahçeri Tozun(2000) pointed out Quebec will be one model for the confederation in Cyprus, and the president of theTurkish Cypriotsf side Denktash described that the Montenegro model will be proper for Cyprus.

[32] According to Bahçeri, Tozun(2000), if the freedom of people will be opened, the daily life of the Turkish Cypriotsf side will be dangerous.