gThe Possibility of the Genuine Trust
Relation Between
Keisuke Tochio
Introduction
In this essay, as one part of my studying about the stability in the
Balkan States, I will analyze the bilateral relation between two major
countries in this area,
In this context, I will focus on two cumbersome obstacles which prevent the cooperative bilateral relation, the Cyprus Conflict and the Aegean Conflict. Because of these conflicts, only in 1990s two countries went very close to the war at least two times. However in other words, if these conflicts will be solved, there are only small problems which can not prevent the present reconciliatory atmosphere. Therefore, in this essay, I will try to propose soluvable policies about two conflicts, especially the Cyprus Conflict. For this purpose, I will use following three chapters.
In the first chapter, as the precondition of this essay, I will confirm the mutuality between the bilateral relation and the whole stability in this area. In this part, I will put stress on two major countriesf cost and benefit by their contributing the stability of this region.
In the second chapter, I will analyze two cumbersome conflicts, the Cyprus Conflict and the Aegean Conflict. In this part, I will try to insist that the Cyprus Conflict is the main obstacle for both countries than the Aegean one.
At last, I will try to find out the concrete solution for the Cyprus Conflict. In this chapter, I will lead the conclusion by analyzing three choices for it, the federation, the confederation and two independent states.
Chapter.1
The Mutuality between the Regional Stability and the Bilateral Relation
Before
discussing about the relation between
1. The
Impact of the Bilateral Relation toward the Regional Stability
Many
authors argued already, the bilateral relation between
After 1989 when the Balkan States countries could get their own independences, the reconciliatory cooperation atmosphere the gGolden Erah[1] was created. However, on the one hand it was recognized for the good chance for the reconciliation, on the other hand it was composed only by strategical bilateral agreements of friendship and cooperation. So that it mean, even if this Golden Era seemed like the reconciliatory atmosphere, it can be pointed out that this term was just a preparation term for following two axes[2], the one included Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia, the other contained Greece, Serbia and Russia[3].
As
one cause of deteriorated stability in the Balkan States, many authors pointed
out the bilateral relation between
After
the Dayton Agreement, in stead of these two axes, the emergence of new efforts
to stabilize this region was recognized. These were the international
organizationfs one and the EUfs one. A lot of kinds
of regional initiatives which were launched by outside actors can be
recognized. In fact, they proved the efficiency of their missions in both
In the context of the self-governance, the bilateral relation between two major countries is indispensable. As I mentioned already, the strength of these countries were proved by their making two axes during the Yugoslavia Conflict. In the size of the economy, both major countries are superior to others. In the political aspects, both countries have a number of channels toward regional and international organizations. Therefore, it can be said that the possibility of their contribution toward the stability of this region has the key for the true success.
2. The
Cost-Benefit Analysis about the Unstable Region
As I mentioned above, the impact of the bilateral relation between two major countries in this region is enormous toward the Stability of the Balkan States. However, if the benefit of the stability is not bigger than the cost of it, it is not possible to make two countries go to the stability efforts. Therefore, in this part, I will try to assert that the benefit from the stability is bigger than the cost by two political perspectives, one is the liberalism or pluralism aspect which puts stress on economic activities and non-governmental actors, the other is the realist aspect which emphasizes the inter-governmental actors.
Firstly,
from the political dimension of the pluralism or the liberalism, it is clear
that the benefit of the stability is much bigger than the cost. As I mentioned
already, in the size of the economy, both countries are superior to others. In
other words, this means both of them are dependent upon the world economy
heavily[6].
Therefore, the damage of conflicts toward the economy is disastrous. According
to the IMF and the World Bank[7], the
only direct damage of the Kosovo crisis which much smaller than the
Secondly,
from the political dimension of the realism, it can be also said that the
present unstable situation is not beneficial, but costly for both countries. In
this realism analysis, I picked up the Kurd problem, as one of the most
difficult problems for
supports
3. The
Importance of the Cooperation between Two Major Regional Countries
In
this chapter, I tried to confirm the deep mutuality between the regional
stability and the bilateral relation. In the first part, the certain impact of
the bilateral relation between
Chapter 2 Conflicts and
the Present Conciliatory Atmosphere in Two Countries
In
this chapter, I will set two objectives for the following chapters. The firs
one is to emphasize the importance of the
1.
Two Difficult Conflicts, gthe
As I mentioned above, the bilateral relation between
As critical causes of the antagonism between them, two conflicts, gthe
The
About the Aegean Sea Conflict, both
As a whole, these two conflicts not only prevent the effective
cooperation, but also deteriorated the distrust relation between
2.
The Analysis about the
Relation between Both Conflicts
As I mentioned above, it is clear that these two conflicts are critical for them. However, these two problems were related each other from the beginning. In addition, from one view point it can be said that they were not just related, but also they shaped one center-periphery relation in which the Cyprus Conflict occupied the central position. In this part, I will prove this theory by analyzing some critical points of the Aegean Conflict. In concrete, I will show that the Aegean Sea Conflict was leaded by the Cyprus Conflict by using two analysis methods, the chronological and the issue-oriented analysis.
Firstly by analyzing the chronological aspects of two conflicts, it
can be thought that the Aegean Sea Conflict was occurred by the extreme tension
of the Cyprus Conflict. The first crisis of the Aegean Sea Conflict was occurred
in 1976, this time was fitted just 2 years after
Secondly, I will try to assert that the importance of the Aegean Sea
Conflict tends to be decreased, by using the issue-oriented analysis. Generally
in addition to factors of the Cyprus Conflict, this conflict was leaded by two
direct causes, the transport method problem and the oil resource problem.
Firstly, this conflict was leaded by the transport methods problem, especially
for
Compared
with the Aegean Sea Conflict, the importance of the Cyprus Conflict has been
increased in both physical and mental sense. Bahçeri separted mental
impacts of it along with two chronological aspects, the term from 1963 to 1974
and the term after 1974. According to his analysis, the former term became the
trauma for Turkish Cypriots, because in this term the discrimination toward
them were expanded by denying most of their rights which were recognized in
1960fs constitution. However, on the other hand, 1974
So that, from beginnings of both conflicts, the center of gravity about the relation between two conflicts was existed in the Cyprus Conflict. In addition, recently the gap of the balance tends to be increased.
3.
The Present Reconciliatory
Atmosphere
As I mentioned already, these two conflicts are critical obstacles
for establishing the true trust relation between
Firstly, I will clarify the history process of this bilateral relation. In this part, I will set g1997h as the important turning point for it. In general, although it is said that the 1999fs disastrous earthquake was the turning point, according to my studying it was just one event to accelerate it.
Before 1997, the reconciliatory atmosphere could not be recognized.
As evidences of this distrust relation, I will employ two elements, two crises
during 1997 and the diplomacy of both countries about
However,
after 1997 the diplomatic relation between them was changed completely. Although
both countriesf positions about two conflicts were rigid, the diplomatic
relation about
Secondly, I will confirm that this atmosphere is toward genuine trust relation. In spite of crises between them, also in old ages conciliation atmosphere was sometime created. However, most of them depended only on bilateral political efforts. Therefore, their relation was broken by external elements[23]. Compared with these previous attempts, the present atmosphere tends to be created by all three elements which are essential for the regional stability, international organizations, regional organizations and bilateral relation. Above all, the role of the EU is critical. As I explained already, it is worth noting that the EU tries to create physical networks beyond the border, that was lacked in previous conciliatory atmosphere.
Therefore,
it can be said that although two conflicts are obstacle for them, the present
reconciliatory atmosphere which was never appeared before has the possibility
for realizing the genuine trust relation between them. And in other words, only
at present it is possible to solve their cumbersome conflict problems by using
the present atmosphere
Chapter 3 Toward the Genuine Trust
From
previous two chapters, two facts can be recognized. The first one is that two
conflicts, especially the Cyprus Conflict, are most cumbersome obstacles for
the genuine trust relation for both countries. The second one is that the
present reconciliatory atmosphere which was never emerged before has the possibility
toward the genuine trust relation between them. Therefore, in this chapter I
will try to propose concrete policies for solving the Cyprus Conflict by
analyzing future governance style in this island. For this purpose, I will set
three strategies. Firstly, I will analyze some choices of the governance style
in
1.
Three Choices for Solving
the
In general, three governance styles are proposed as choices for solving the Cyprus Conflict, the independent sate style, the federation style and the confederation style. The difference of them is dependent upon the degree of the integration. In this part, I will explain about them briefly.
Firstly,
the independent state style is the most desirable for TRNC[24]. It
means to establish two independent nation states,
Secondly,
the federation style is relatively desirable for
Thirdly,
the confederation style can be said the compromise between previous two
governance styles. This style means to establish one nation in
2.
The Possible Governance
Style in
Although in theory three choices are proposed to the Cyprus Conflict, in practice the choice for solving it is limited only to the confederation style. In this part, I will explain why the choice is limited by four aspects, the economical, the political, the geographical and the international environmental one.
Firstly, from the political aspect, on the one hand the Greek
Cypriotsf side wishes the federation, but on the other hand the Turkish
Cypriotsf side wishes the independent state style. The reason is related the
proportion of
Secondly,
from the economical aspect, positions of both sides are more complicated. For
the Greek Cypriotsf side, they can stand on the advantageous position. On the other
hand, the Turkish Cypriotsf side whose GDP per capita is a third of the Greek
Cypriotsf sidefs one will suffer from the gap between them. However at the same
time, the economic integration means that the Turkish Cypriotsf side will join
the EU with the Greek Cypriotsf side. In other words, the Turkish Cypriotsf
side will get the tremendous assist from the EU. It is very attractive for the
Turkish Cypriotsf side whose GDP is deponent on
Thirdly,
from the geographical aspect, the federation style will be impossible. As I
mentioned at the previous chapter, 40% of all population in the Turkish
Cypriotsf side is the immigration from
At
last, in spite of all elements which prevent the integration, the international
environment is positive for the integration. As I mentioned in the economic
aspect, the Turkish Cypriotsf side tends to be the too heavy burden for
As a conclusion, both the federation which the Greek Cypriotsf side wants and the independent nation style that the Turkish Cypriotsf side wants will be impossible in practice. So that, both side must find out the agreement point in the confederation style which has flexible choices in detailed points.
3.
The Most Appropriate
Policy for
As I mentioned at the previous part, the agreement point can be
thought in the confederation governance style. Therefore in this part, I will
think about detailed governance of
Before thinking about detailed features of the confederation in
Firstly, in the political aspect, the governing institution which
governs whole
Secondly, in the economical aspect, the problem will be the degree of the freedom of three elements. Compared with the Greek Cypriotsf side who wants all of them, the Turkish Cypriotsf side wants the proper degree of the freedom of two elements, the capital and goods, but not people. If all of them will be opened suddenly, the Turkish Cypriotsf side will be overwhelming by the Greek Cypriotsf side, Because of the big economy gap. Therefore, for protecting peoplefs daily life, the freedom of people will be
protected at least[32]. However, because the external economic activity will be necessary for the Turkish Cypriotsf side, other two elements will be opened with the proper speed. In these conditions, they will have to find out the compromise.
As whole, in these elements, I put the stress on the Turkish
Cypriots sidefs priorities, because they will be a minority in
Conclusion
In
this essay, as one part of my studying about the cooperation for the stability
in the Balkan States, I focused on the bilateral relation between
It
is clear that the solution for the Cyprus Conflict will lead the genuine trust
relation between
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[1] Kondonis, Haralambos(1998) called the
regional cooperative term from 1989 to 1991 the gGolden Erah.
[2] Turan, Ilter(1998) indicated,
during this era the base of following two axes was prepared.
[3] Kondonis, Haralambos(1998) pointed out
that there were two axis before 1995. One included
[4] As evidences of their initiatives, Turan(1998) described about
the fact that Serbian regime could get supplies from
[5] Bugajski, Janusz(2000), Bildt, Carl(2000), Steil, Benn(1999) criticized the present over- dependent situation in the Balkan States. In addition, they even assert this situation was one of causes which made their reforms delay.
[6] For example, the trade proportion of whole GDP increases steadily
in both countries. In
[7] The IMF and The World Bank(1999), tried to estimate the cost of the Kosovo Conflict. In this paper, the direct damage to especially the Balkan States was estimated.
[8] Nicole Watts(1999) pointed out that especially
after 1980s the Kurdish problem became to rise.
[9] Kotzias, Konstantinos(2000) pointed
out, in spite of the reconciliatory atmosphere between
[10] Bahçeri,Tozun(2000)
pointed out the luck of the self-governace, as one critical factor for the
Cyprus Conflict. In detail, this 1960 constitution
enacted the Turkish Cypriotsf right broadly. However, especially the veto right
of the Turkish Cypriots was the problem for the Greek Cypriots.
[11] According to Kurop, Marcia(1998),
after 1974fs intervention, about 35,000 troops occupied about northern 30 % of
this island.
[12] The TRNC is recognized officially only by the
[13] Berletta, Michael(1998)
described the 1997fs tension which was caused by the supply of the s-300
missile system from
[14] Moustakis, Fotis(1998) indicated that in 1958, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was enacted. It indicated all countries that the sea border is limited 6 miles from each countryfs shelves.
[15] Moustakis, Fotis(1998) explained that this new law changed Turkeyfs sea territory in the Aegean Sea from 35% to 9% of all, but Greecefs one was increased to 64% of all.
[16] Moustakis, Fotis(1998).
[17] Bahçeri, Risopolous(1996, 2000) pointed out, the 1974
[18]
[19] Economic Intelligence Country Report,
[20] According to Bahçeri(2000),
about 40% of TRNC is the immigration from
[21] The Foreign Minister of Greece Papandreou(2001)
described that this changing was dependent upon
[22] The EU tries to construct infrastructure networks which are beyond both countriesf border, they are transport, energy and telecommunication. They are initiated by TENs(Trans European Netwroks), but at the same time various kinds of funds is used for this construction. More detailed information is available in the EUfs TENs HP, Regional Policyfs HP and articles which are listed in the bibliography.
[23] For example,
[24] TRNC declared her independence in 1983, but recognized only by
[25] Heywood, Andrew(1997), POLITICS, pp127
[26] Bahçeri, Tozun(1996,2000)described that in fact in 1960s when the Greek Cypriots side wanted to stop or decrease Turkish Cypriotsf rights, they could do that by using their dominant proportion of the parliament.
[27] gThe Denktash Dilemma OPINION: By Christodoulos G. Pelaghiash, CYAD, 29, May, 2002
[28] According to Bahçeri,
Tozun(2000),
[29]
[30] Most of articles about the Cyprus Conflict, Kurop,Marcia(1998), Black, Jan(2001), Bahçeri, Tozun(1996, 2000) pointed out
that the origin of this conflict was caused mainly by
not involvement of both sides into the 1960 constitution. In addition, about
the whole Balkan Conflict, Macgregor,
[31] Bahçeri
Tozun(2000) pointed out Quebec will be one model for the confederation in
Cyprus, and the president of theTurkish Cypriotsf side Denktash described
that the Montenegro model will be proper for Cyprus.
[32] According to Bahçeri,
Tozun(2000), if the freedom of people will be opened,
the daily life of the Turkish Cypriotsf side will be dangerous.