<<Taikichiro
Mori Memorial Research Fund>>
Graduate Student
Researcher Development Grant Report
(Academic Year 2010)
Name of the
Research Project |
Development of
Chinese Marine Policy and China’s Policies towards Japan |
Name of the
Researcher |
Vida MACIKENAITE
|
Affiliation |
Graduate
School of Media and Governance, Master’s Program (GR) |
Student Year |
Year 2 |
PURPOSE OF THE FIELDWORK
The fieldwork was conducted as a part of Master’s
Thesis research at the SFC, Keio University. The main purpose of it was to complete
a number of interviews with the scholars and to collect materials and
information for the final Master’s Thesis paper. Originally during this
fieldwork the student intended to focus mainly on China’s marine policy and its
policy toward Japan. During the fieldwork the scope of it was expanded and some
additional interviews conducted. The fieldwork in Shanghai, China was conducted
in September, immediately after the fishing boat incident near the Senkaku
Islands. Such a situation provided an opportunity to discuss China’s policies
toward Japan with a number of Chinese students and other citizens. These
interviews provided a strong basis for the conceptual framework of the final
Master’s Thesis paper (please see The
Importance of the Fieldwork below). Some materials, important for the
Master’s Thesis research were also collected, mainly at the Shanghai Library in
Shanghai, China.
RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
The fieldwork consisted of 3 parts: (1) interviews
with China researchers and the specialists of China-Japan relations; (2)
collection of the materials, necessary for the Master’s Thesis research. These
materials were mainly related to the East China Sea gas field dispute between
China and Japan, China-Japan relation in general, as well as public opinion and
political participation in China; (3) interviews with the Chinese people, some
of them students. The interviews focused on the East China Sea gas field
dispute and joint gas field development in the area, general China-Japan
relation and the recent incident near the Senkaku Islands, when a Chinese
fishing boat collided with 2 fishing boats of the Japan Coast Guard. Such
expansion of the fieldwork activities’ scope was naturally suggested by the
situation. A crisis in the bilateral relation between China and Japan created
an opportunity to successfully conduct such kind of interviews that later
proved to be of a special importance for the research.
IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH
This fieldwork provided important material and also
conceptual ideas for the student’s final Master’s Thesis paper. The information
gathered during the interviews became the basis for the conceptual framework of
the final paper. It suggested that 2 types of citizens’ opinions can be
identified in China – public opinions and
domestic opinion. These theoretical
concepts were formulated later, after consulting the literature of political
science. However, the main idea came during the interviews, especially
conducted after the Senkaku Islands incident. In this way the fieldwork became
a corner stone of the final Master’s Thesis paper, especially the conceptual
framework of the research.
The
interviews and talks with the Chinese people revealed that there are various
opinions in regards to the East China Sea gas field dispute. At the same time
this raised a question how the Chinese foreign policy makers are able to observe
such opinions when formulating their policies toward Japan. Although the number
of the Internet users has multiplied over the last decade,[1] under
usual circumstances these public opinions are rather limited in number. They
are expressed and supported by a critical mass only in extraordinary
circumstances, when domestic discontent accumulates. For example, such was the
case during the anti-Japanese movements in 2003 and 2005. In July 2003 during
the period of 10 days the “Alliance of Patriots” (爱国同盟网) collected and submitted to the
Ministry of Railways (中华人民共和国铁道部)
in Beijing 82,752 signatures against
Japanese involvement in the construction
of the Beijing-Shanghai high speed railway.[2] Two
years later 10 million signatures were collected for the protest against
Japan’s bid for the permanent seat in the UN Security Council.[3]
Eventually it led to the protests by some 10,000 people in Beijing on April 9,
2005 and a double number in Shanghai on April 16.[4] However,
under regular conditions (during the periods of social stability) such number
of opinions is hardly ever expressed in consensus. Instead, they are expressed
as a mixture of scattered opinions. Hence in the case of China it would be more
accurate to refer to the opinions, expressed on a daily basis as public opinions (rather than a singular public opinion). These public opinions are a variety of
publicly expressed views surrounding certain issues, mainly voiced through the
Internet. Previous research argues that publicly voiced opinions serve “as a
barometer of the kinds of emotions that would get the protesters into the
streets.”[5]
This
argument suggests that there exist a wider number of citizens whose opinions
are important for the policy makers, rather than only the limited scattered
opinions daily posted online. Such opinions become evident in cases when a
sensitive issue arises and domestic discontent accumulates. The cases of 2003
and 2005 anti-Japanese movements have just been described above. Similar
situation was caused by the Qiqihai incident, when 37 Chinese were severely
injured and one man later died after being exposed to the abandoned weapons in
China since its war with Japan. On September 18, 2003 Chinese activists
“delivered to the Japanese Embassy [an anti-Japanese petition] in ten black
binders with 5000 pages of the names and home addresses of the 1.2 million
signatories.”[6]
When compared with the scattered public opinions such forms of political
participation represent a consensus of a significant number of citizens.
Further, it is not favored by the government because it threatens the
legitimacy of the CCP-led regime, as it is explained in the following section.
Finally, such views are translated into public opinion only in critical cases
that is when the citizens’ discontent mounts. Otherwise this general opinion of
the citizens, who are interested in politics and could be mobilized, can be
only assumed. Leonard W.Doob describes it as internal public opinion which can be referred to when the attitudes
that people posses are not expressed.[7]
In
the final paper, seeking to differentiate between the public opinions as
defined above and general opinion, expressed only in extraordinary cases, a
term domestic opinion was introduced.
Its meaning is close to the term public
opinion in democratic systems in the sense that it defines the complex
opinion of the society surrounding public issues. It is internal public opinion as defined by Dobb, but for the purpose of
simplicity the term domestic opinion was
used. Public opinions clearly expressed on a daily basis constitute a part of
domestic opinion.
Such
a distinction is necessary when explaining Chinese foreign policy. Each of the
terms suggests a different pattern of foreign policy making. If Chinese policy
makers merely respond to the public opinions when making foreign policy, the
linkage between public opinion and China’s foreign policy is rather simple. The
input of the policy process is clearly expressed in the form of public
opinions, and the policy makers may know what policies they are expected to
adopt. On the other hand, if it is the consideration of domestic opinion, which
actually shapes foreign policy decisions, as the hypothesis suggested, this
linkage becomes more complicated. Rather than reacting to clearly defined
demands from the citizens, the policy makers adopt policy decisions, which are
expected to not provoke the rise of negative opinions. As the general domestic
opinion is clearly expressed only after such negative opinions accumulate, the
policy makers find themselves in a situation where they have to speculate one
step ahead of the actual policy results. In such a situation there is a risk
that the policy makers err on the side of caution. That is their policy
decisions might be more constrained than it is actually necessary. Due to such
different policy implications of these two types of opinions, this distinction
between public opinions and domestic opinion is necessary. The
interviews conducted during this fieldwork gave the student an idea about this
peculiarity of public opinion in China.
[1] In
June 2010 the number of Internet users in China was around 420 million (China Internet Network Information Center. Accessed December 20, 2010.
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/index/0O/index.htm.)
[2] James
Reilly. 2008. “Harmonious World and Public Opinion in
China’s Japan Policy”. In ‘Harmonious world’ and China’s New Foreign
Policy, edited by Jean-Marc F.
Blanchard
and Sujian Guo. Lanham: Lexington Books, pp.189-223. P.192.
[3] East Asian Strategic Review
2006. The National Institute
for Defense Studies, Japan.p.105.
[4] Ibid, p.106.
[5] Alastair
Iain Johnston. 2004. “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International
Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?” China
Quarterly 179: 603-628. P.626.
[6] Reilly, p.198.
[7]
Leonard W. Doob. Public
Opinion and Propaganda. New
York: H.Holt, 1948. P.39.