Economic Geography, Political Map and the Effectiveness of the Power originated from Asymmetric Economic Interdependence: Across Taiwan-Strait Relationship as a Case
Qunbo Gao
Master
Program
Graduate
School of Media and Governance.
Abstract:
There’s an interesting puzzle in the international relations that asymmetrical
economic interdependence doesn’t bring effective power. The less dependent
actor which is predominant in an interdependent dyad couldn’t transform its
economic influence into political influence by using economic means, and thus
fails to exert its power over the more dependent actor. Based on existing
literature, the author constructs a new explanatory model by utilizing economic
geography and political bloc, and argues that whether economic geography can
match with the political bloc is crucial to the power from asymmetric economic
interdependence. The case study of Russia taking advantage of its predominant
position to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO bolsters core viewpoint presented
by this article.
Economic
interdependence is one of the primary characteristics of modern world. In
academia, studies on economic interdependence can be divided into two major
approaches. One is security-oriented approach, which focuses on the causal
relationship between peace (or conflict) and economic interdependence, that is
whether the economic interdependence contributes to peace or not. Scholars
fared well toward this approach, as three main perspectives — positive,
negative, neutral — having been shaped out.[1] The
other is power-oriented approach. Most of the economic interdependent relations
in the world are asymmetrical, far from symmetrical, which means that in an
economic interdependent dyad one party depends more than the other. What’s more
is that asymmetrical economic interdependence will bring significant
consequences to international politics because the asymmetry may provide the
actors sources of influence in their interactions with others.[2]
In another word, the asymmetrical economic interdependence is a source of
power.[3]
In light of the intrinsic attributions of power, the less dependent may be able
to coerce the more dependent into complying with its specific political demands
through manipulating the asymmetrical relationship.[4] In
the power-oriented studies, nevertheless, scholars tend to take the process of
power generating from asymmetry as spontaneous, thus the in-depth research
toward this approach is still in lack.
Numerous international
political events have demonstrated that the power derived from asymmetrical
economic interdependence is not ever effective, that is, the less dependent
fails to transform its economic predominance into effective political influence
to achieve its political goals from time to time. Why would this happen? Is
there any factor or condition that impedes the asymmetrical power to take
effect? Under what situation will the asymmetrical power come into effect and
under what situation it would not? This article attempts to answer these
questions with a new explanatory framework.
As a matter of
fact, in academia, a satisfying explanation for the above research question is
still lacking although that relevant studies from other fields, such as
security-oriented approach, economic sanctions, etc., could shed some lights on
it. The most essential deficiency of those existing helpful explanations lies
in that none of them provides a direct and specific explanation to the failure
of the power in asymmetrical economic interdependence. To fill this gap, the
explanatory model which this article attempting to provide will penetrate into
the politics and economy of the more dependent state at domestic level, which
means to adopt a perspective that underscoring the role of domestic factors,
then introduce two key terms —economic geography and political bloc— as the
cornerstones to construct a logical mechanism for the object of explaining the
given research question.
Literature Review
As a matter of
fact, in academia, a satisfying explanation for the above research question is
still lacking although that relevant studies from other fields, such as
security-oriented approach, economic sanctions, etc., could shed some lights on
it.
1.
Exit
costs
It is widely
known that Keohane and Nye had distinguished two characteristics of economic
interdependence — sensitivity and vulnerability — to better analyze the power in
asymmetric economic interdependence. They proposed that the vulnerability is more
essential and helpful than sensitivity when understanding the power generated
from asymmetrical economic interdependence. The more vulnerable the state is,
the more likely that the other state in an asymmetrical economic interdependent
dyad would impose its political influence over the state.[5]
Mark J. C.
Crescenzi advanced Keohane and Nye’s two conceptions, introduced a new
term—“Exit Costs”.[6]
He designed a model, in which, he assumed that states are involved in economic
relationships that maximize welfare, then the costs involved in exiting these
relationships are essentially what is lost in switching from this “best” option
to the next best alternative. Then the opportunity costs associated with these
alternatives are defined as exit cost. Scale of exit costs is measured by the
intensity of economic interdependence and the ease in which the interested
parties can find alternative resources for economic exchange. Two economic
characteristics—asset specificity and market structure—can serve to
conceptualize exit costs: immobile asset specificity makes the market structure
more rigid, thereby it becomes more difficult to find fungible resources, then
the exit costs increase.
Although
Crescenzi’s exit costs aimed at analyzing the mechanism of military conflict
between two states, this theory model shed some lights on studying
effectiveness of interdependence power. Besides, served as an indicator, exit
costs can assess the sensitivity and vulnerability of interdependence at the
same time, this is great advancement comparing with the concepts of Keohane and
Nye.[7]
However, the shortcoming of Crescenzi’s theoretical approach is that it is
typical nation-centralism which views domestic economy as an iron-board, thus ignoring
the substantial structural influence that the diversity of domestic politics
and economy could impose on interstate relations.
2.
Bargaining
theory
Based on modern
bargaining theory, R. Harrison Wagner contended that asymmetrical economic
interdependence does not imply that one bargainer will be able to exercise
political influence over another. The use of economic interdependence for
political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources
for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than
they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the
economic relationship alone. He pointed out, “If political concessions are
expected as a result of a threat to interrupt an existing economic
relationship, this must be because there is unexploited bargaining power in the
existing relationship, that is, the party demanding the political concession
could, if it chose, successfully demand more favorable terms in the existing
relationship.” However, “Even if there is unexploited bargaining power in an
existing economic relationship, there may be no way to convert it into
political influence, since there may be no feasible exchange of economic
benefits for political concessions that is mutually beneficial.”[8]
Wagner’s
theoretical model is bargaining theory that based on rational man and the
principle of market transaction, provided a useful approach to understand the
relationship between political influence and asymmetrical interdependence. However,
he viewed economic coercion as a mutually beneficial process, which obviously
deviates from the real world. In numerous situations, economic coercion is more
of a process in which intimidator intends to change the status quo and the
target country endeavors to maintain the status quo. This specificity of the
basic logic of the theoretical model impairs its explanatory power to a certain
extent.
3. Explanation from
economic sanctions theory
Besides the
above theories, relevant studies of economic sanctions can provide some
referable conclusions to the given research question. It is because economic
sanctions are a sort of the critical measures for the power in asymmetrical
interdependence to play its due role.
A.
Big
Power Politics
When the less
dependent attempts to employ economic leverage to gain political influence, if
a third party appears, particularly when the third party is another big power,
the effect of the power of asymmetrical economic interdependence would be
impacted. Some scholars thought that the failure of the economic sanctions is
mainly due to the support from the strong or rich allies of the targets which
will greatly compensate the loss of the target.[9]
Similar situation often happened in the economic sanctions cases that
engendered by the cleavage of ideologies between big power and small power
during Cold War. As most of the aims of the economic sanctions in those Cold
War cases referred to the subversion of the political regime of the targeted
country, the target usually could gain the aids from the adversary of the
sender. These compensated measurements offset the impacts and impaired the
expected effects of the economic sanctions to a large extent.
There are
several problems if applying this explanation to the analysis of the
effectiveness of the power in asymmetrical interdependence. First, this
explanation is generally available to the period of Cold War when the aims of
target were ideology-oriented other than specific foreign policy-oriented. Second,
this explanation ignores the specific situation of the small powers, during the
period of two poles, small powers were the byproducts in the games of great
powers. Third and the foremost, in this explanation, the relationship between
the target and the sender is not certainly economic interdependent, such as the
sanctions case of U.S.-Cuba and U.S.-China, however, in the given research
question, the target and sender are not only economic interdependent but also
highly asymmetrical interdependent.
B.
Domestic
Factors of the Senders
It has no doubt
that sanctions will damage sender’s economy. But as most of the senders are
great powers, loss caused by sanctions is negligible.[10]
However, if the sanction loses the supports of most civilians and influential
enterprises, sanctions may become fairly difficult to be sustained. If the
people of target country learned those situations in sender country, resolve of
resistance will be reinforced. All the above constructs a vicious circle, then,
“sanction fatigue” emerges out, then being strengthened by time, the sender has
to give up.[11]
When coming to
being applied to analyze the given research questions, the biggest deficiency
of this explanation is it argues that under asymmetrical economic interdependence
economic sanctions have little or negligible impacts to the senders. However,
the fact is that the sender could afford the economic losses generated by the
economic sanctions because generally these losses are not large enough to
ignite serious domestic responses.
C.
Regime
Type of the Targets
Some scholars
hold that economic sanctions are more difficult to success in authoritarian
regimes.[12]
Because authoritarian regimes can employ its unrestricted power to protect its
elites from being impaired, transferring the losses to the domestic average. Moreover,
in many situations, economic sanctions may help enforcing the control of the
authoritarian regimes over its civilians.[13] In
contrast, if the target is democracy, as the welfare of the citizens are seriously
impaired by the economic sanctions, the target will be more prone to comply
with the demands of the sender because the government of a democracy will be
afraid to pay domestic political costs for the imposed economic sanctions. The
deficiency of this explanation is that the dichotomy between authoritarian
regime and democracy is somewhat over-simplified, thus helpless to explore the
internal mechanism of economic sanctions.
In sum, the
previous literature certainly provided some instructive reference for
understanding the given research question, but none of them can directly explain
it. In this case, my research plans to propose a new explanatory framework
which takes a domestic perspective of the more dependent, emphasizing the role
of domestic factors.
Understanding Economic
Geography and Political Bloc
Economic
Geography
Economic
geography is a term borrowed from spatial economics, and is simply defined as “the
location of production in space” by Paul Krugman.[14]
Economic activities, such as sectoral distribution, the flows of the factors of
production, etc., are not distributed evenly within a state, but with spatial
distinctiveness, which means that a state will be divided into different
economic sections along the geographic lines by the “intangible hands”.
There are mainly
two levels to understand economic geography. First, the domestic economy level.
In a state, generally, each region itself possesses distinctive and relatively
stable regional production mode and sectoral structure, which, when moving up
to the national level, turns out to be a fact that different economic sections
have its own industrial advantages, concentration of production factors,
distributional features of the sectors and so on, respectively. Beside this
point, in the era of globalization, the economic geography can not only be
measured by domestic economic indicators, but also embodied in foreign economic
activities, which is to say that economic geographical disparities in a state
could produce regional disparities on their respective external economic
relations with other states.[15]
For example, economic sections in a given state would differ greatly in their
respective trade partners and sources of investment due to their differences on
factors such as geographical location, transport cost, etc.
Why does the
economic activities in a state exhibit clearly geographical disparity? Paul
Krugman proposed three primary reasons in his studies. First, market-size
effects. A large local market creates both “backward linkages”— sites with good
access to large markets are preferred locations for the production of goods
subject to economies of scale — and ‘forward linkages’—a large local market
supports the local production of intermediate goods, lowering costs for downstream
producers, thus enforcing the localization together. Second, thick labor
markets. An industrial concentration supports a thick local labor market,
especially for specialized skills, so that employees find it easier to find
employers and vice versa. Third, pure external economies. A local concentration
of economic activity may create more or less pure external economies via technology
spillovers. For example, the flows of knowledge and information in a region
with industrial concentration could create certain benefits.[16]
Besides above three reasons, historical accident, such as the policy-decision
of local leadership, also plays an crucial role in shaping the economic
geography. Historical accident gives rise to the emergence of economic
geography, enforcing and thus solidifying it to be a persistent and irreversible
objective phenomenon via “Path Dependence” effect.[17]
From a
perspective of international political economics, the significance of the term
of economic geographic is that it is able to indicate the localism or regionalism
of economic welfare, a widespread phenomenon in modern world. The term,
therefore, has superior explanatory power than the other explanatory tools. First,
compared to the statism of economic welfare, economic geography can crack the
crust of a whole state, penetrating into its domestic economic structure,
examining lots of critical domestic economic activities, such as sectoral
structure, flows of trade, sector concentration, commercial investment, etc.
Different regions will play distinct role in their respective economic ties
with foreign actors in light of their own distinctive production modes. Therefore,
when changes taken place in either domestic or international economy, the gains
and loss usually differ greatly among regions: if the economic changes do harm
to the entire economy of the state, the economic welfare of some regions may be
damaged more, whereas other regions could hardly be impacted and certain
regions may even gain substantial benefits from those changes; if the economic
changes improve the entire welfare of the state, certain region may gain more
than the others, whereas some region may even be damaged. All the above manifests
that the statism perspective is inane to certain extent.
Second, compared
to the other domestic political factors for analyzing, the merit of economic
geography lies in its emphasis on the geographical attribution of the economic
welfare, which is fairly different from the traditional analytical methodology with
emphasis on the sociality of economic interests. Previous research often selected
class, sector, industry and social agents with personified traits, as interest
subjects, and simultaneously set up the gains and loss of the economic welfare
of specific interest subject under specific economic policy as the logical
start for analyzing and demonstrating.[18] However,
due to the objective existence of economic geography, the economic welfare of
various social agents, to a large extent, are defined by the scope of economic
geography. Moreover, both the location selected and formation of the interests
of social agents are closely correlated with the geography. Different economic
sections have distinct economic interests, so their positions and preferences
regarding economic policies will differ greatly as well. The degree of the disparity
that the different economic geographical sections being impacted would be much
severer than that of the disparity that the different social agents being impacted
in a state. The diverse interests of various social agents or various
endowments would be integrated or disintegrated under domestic sector division
and economic geography at the regional level before being expressed at the
state level.[19]
Nevertheless,
some important points need to be clarified here. The analytical perspective
from economic geography does not essentially contradict with the perspective
from social agents. As a matter of fact, these two perspectives might be highly
overlapped, if there is not
conspicuous disparity exists in economic geography. However, under the
objective existence of economic activities such as sector division, the
geographical concentration of economic activities fuses and then solidifies the
divergent economic interests and welfare of various social agents. Thus,
adopting the perspective of economic geography will be more helpful for
understanding the impact of economic activities on governmental economic
decision-making.
Political
Bloc
Political bloc
is a combined study on political geography theory and political cleavage
theory. Literally, political geography is the science of studying the
relationship between political behavior and geographical factors, focusing on
the geographical factors in political activities and the political implication
of geography.[20]
And political cleavage theory studies the observable social and ideological divergence, which
get structuralized and long-lasting boundaries, among the pivotal political
agents in a state. Based on the above two definitions, two elements of
political bloc are worthy to be noted. First is the long-existing disparities
of the political identities, political preferences and political values of
different administrative regions in a state over various political issues. Second,
the disparities mentioned above exist as a state of spatial distribution,
exhibiting a significantly geographical feature. More specifically, the disparities
of the political identities, political preferences and political values that “inspire
particular kinds of political action therefore are embedded in the places or
geographical contexts where people live their lives”.[21]
Thus, political bloc is primarily used for discerning the spatiality and
locality of political choice, and can be defined as that the political
participative propensities of the people from different areas in a state
diverge and then integrate into regional coalitions with distinct or sometimes
even antagonistic political preferences along certain geographical borders. In
contemporary world politics, this phenomenon along with its impact on state
politics can be best exemplified through the case of Scotland-England in Great
Britain and the English-speaking sections and the French-speaking sections in Canada.
Numerous factors will contribute to the formation of political bloc, including
ethnic composition, language discrepancies, geographical distances, religious
beliefs, cultural differences, political identities, historical heritage, etc..
Apparently, since each country and region possesses its own distinctive
historical, social and cultural heritage, the causes and processes of the
formation of their political bloc differ to some extent.
Compared with
surveying the specific attitudes toward certain political issues, it is more
measurable to comprehend political bloc through different political parties’
vote-getting situations. Because in modern politics, people’s participation in
political life is primarily embodied by the form of participating in election
campaigns, whereas political party is the principal vehicle through which
political actors exercise the elections. Thus, the voting and party supporting situations of the people in
different geographical sections in a state can directly reflect the distribution
of political blocs to a considerable degree. The more concentrated the
geographical section votes to any particular political party, the clearer the
existence of a political bloc is. The political bloc not only implies the partisan
support and selective exclusion of specific geographical section to a
particular political party, but also indicates that this kind of support and exclusion will persist for a
relatively long historical period, exhibiting an attribution of stability. In
fact, the political bloc which appears via either hidden or visible ways is not
an accidental or unusual phenomenon, rather a political reality which
objectively exists in most of the countries in varying degrees. For example, in
the United States, since 1980s the Democrat usually gains more supports than
the Republican in East and West coast; in Thailand, significant disparity have
emerged up between the rural area and the urban bourgeois on the voting
choices; Similarly, in Kirghizstan the southern and the northern have presented
remarkable political cleavage since its independence 1990s, etc.[22]
In sum, within
specific political bloc, the voting intentions of the electorate have a
considerable nature of continuity, which implicates that they may vote to the
same party persistently for an extended period of time, resulting in relatively
steady voting outcomes in almost each constituency without abrupt change. This
phenomenon is primarily due to the existence of “core voter” who exhibits a
high party loyalty in political activities. These core voters will keep voting
to the same political party in key election campaigns with their strong party
identities. They concentrate in certain geographical scope, forming into the
political bloc. As regards to the origins of their “loyalties”, generally,
there have been two explanatory approaches — political party approach and voter
approach. In the political party approach, the contributed factors include the
candidates’ attributes, their stands on specific policy issues and the general
stands of the political party.[23]
In the voter approach, the contributed factors include individual habit, family
background, psychological factors, etc..[24] In
spite of the validity of those explanations, the core voter and the party
identification are both objective phenomenon in political science that have
been verified by statistic data and empirical studies.[25] Understanding
the term of the core voter will be conducive to understanding the discrepancy
of the stability of political supports that a geographical section gives to
particular parties in political bloc.
However, the
political bloc in a state is stable and enduring in a relative sense, rather
than fixed. If indeed fixed, why does each political party make their best
endeavor to compete in the election campaign? And why do the election outcomes
exhibit a high uncertainty, or even be dramatic from time to time? This is
because, in addition to a certain amount of core voters, there are still
considerable amount of swing voters, or so called “neutral voters” in each
geographical section. A swing voter is, opposed to the definition of core
voter, a voter who is not so solidly committed to one candidate or the other.[26]
The voting intention of the swing voter is uncertain during the whole process
of election campaign. Unless up to the exact moment of voting, the swing voter
will not make his final decision. Therefore, the major mission of the parties
in the campaign is to solidify core voters and to win swing voters as many as
possible. The swing voter turns out to be the primary front of the battle among
the political parties, as well the gray area among the geographical borders of
political blocs which playing a key role in its spatial dynamics.[27]
Economic Geography and
Political Blocs under Asymmetrical Economic Interdependence
In the
asymmetrical economic interdependent relations, the exerting of the asymmetrical
power by the less dependent upon the more dependent generally follows this
logic[28]:
the economic leverages imposed by the less dependent in order to realize its
power over the more dependent would negatively impact the domestic economy of
the more dependent, resulting in a relative declination of its economic
welfare. In another hand, from a perspective of the more dependent, based on
the consideration of sustaining their own economic interests, the impacted
domestic actors would seek any possible measures to impose pressure on the
government, urging it to accept the political demands presented by the less
dependent. Voting is the most critical channel for expressing their appeals and
imposing political pressures in a democracy. With an incentive to win the
election campaign and stay in power, the government of the more dependent is
likely to respond the appeals from the impacted actors with satisfying the
political demand of the less dependent, then the power from asymmetrical
economic interdependence comes into effect.
In this logical
chain, there are two key elements. First is the gains and loss of economic
welfare, which is the prerequisite for triggering that logic. Under the policy
of economic sanctions of the less dependent, the general economic welfare of
the more dependent would indeed be impaired. But due to the existence of
economic geography in the more dependent, the distribution of the gains and
loss would appear to be significantly regionalized rather than even. Even if
the same sectors that locate in different regions will also be impacted
differently for the sake of different trade flows. Generally, the regions which
share close economic ties with the less dependent will bear the severest brunt
if the economic ties are cut off; and some of the regions may hardly be
impacted by the economic changes imposed by the less dependent, or even may
gain from it in terms of the domestic regional industrial shift and other
reasons. It can be deduced from this point that the gains and loss in the more dependent
will exhibit an spatially distributional attribution, or to say a
characteristic of regionalism. Therefore, it will be truly difficult to expect
to impose pressures on the government via nationwide united sectors or
endowments. Economic geography can be the optimal framework for analyzing the
collective actions which being taken to impose pressure on the government
decision-making.
And it is nearly
impossible to derive nationwide political action that based on the
consideration of economic interests from economic geography, in another word,
the government of the more dependent would face up to fairly diverse political
claims even which are essentially all from people’s rational concerns on
economic interests: generally, the regions which have a close economic ties
with the less dependent will be the party whose interests are severely
impaired, these regions tend to impose political pressure on the central
government to comply with the political demands offered by the less dependent;
in contrast, the regions which are hardly affected by the cutting off of
economic ties or even gain from that, or actually have a relatively low
economic ties with the less dependent, will tend to impose pressure on the
government to reject the demands of the less dependent or adopt an indifferent
attitude toward this issue. What’s more, the regions which interests are
impaired tend to impose pressure on the government to accept the political
demands of the less dependent, whereas the regions which are hardly impaired or
even gain somewhat are prone to protest the political demands of the less
dependent based on nationalism, or just take an indifferent attitude toward the
whole matter.
Second,
objectively, economic welfare is more of one of the factors that could affect
the decision-making of the government of the more dependent than the sole one. The
economic geographical lobbies from the impaired regions will not necessarily
determine the final decision-making of the central government. The political
bloc, which indicates the domestic endorsement and opposition to the central
government, plays another pivotal role in the operation of the power in
asymmetrical economic interdependence. The emergence of the political bloc
complicates to a considerable extent the decision-making of the government of
the more dependent. The more dependent would not certainly comply with the
political demands of the less dependent due to the consideration on economic
interests even if the economy of the regions being impaired accounts for a major
portion of the overall economy. That is because the decision-making of the
government of the more dependent is not only contingent on the consideration of
gains and loss of the economic welfare, but also on their assessment of winning
the election or staying in power. In this case, it is necessary to examine the
effect of the political bloc. In the more dependent, no matter the party in
power or the out-party, they all possess relatively stable political blocs of
their own. The parties will make their decisions primarily according to the
dominant wills in their respective political blocs.
For better
examining that whether the economic leverages imposed by the less dependent to
the more dependent will bring effective political power under asymmetrical economic
interdependence, this article constructs a simplified model subsuming two major
variables having been elaborated above — economic geography and political bloc.
From the perspective of economic geography, the economic sections of the more
dependent can be fundamentally divided into two parts: (A)
the section whose economic interest being impaired; (B)
the section whose economic interest being relatively unimpaired. And to take if
accepting the political demands of the less dependent or not as criteria, the
political blocs of the party in power of the more dependent could be divided
into two parts as well: (C)
the section which supporting to accept; (D)
the section which opposing to accept. What this simplified model trying to
address is that when the economy of the geographical section being impaired is
more critical than that of the geographical section being relatively
unimpaired, which situation is labeled as “A≥B” in Table 1 , what kind of
policy choice would the more dependent government make under the constraint of
political blocs?
Table 1 The Policy Choice of the Government of the
More Dependent
Economic
Geography Political Bloc |
The distribution of the gains and loss in
different sections |
|
A≥B |
||
Predominance in Election |
C>D |
Coincident
→ Accept → Take effect |
C<D |
Non-coincident
→ Reject → Fail |
*
Source: Designed by the author.
It can be
learned from the simplified model that if the political bloc and the economic
geography are non-coincident, that is, the regions which share a closer
economic relationship with the less dependent are not the major sources of the
constituencies supporting the party in power, whereas the other regions that
supporting the party in power oppose to accept the political or security
demands from the less dependent. In this case, the former would fail to impose
political pressures on the government effectively under the consideration on
economic interests, consequently, the more dependent would have to reject the
political or security demands from the less dependent, the power in the
asymmetrical economic interdependence which possessed by the less dependent
thereby fails. In contrast, when the political bloc and the economic geography
are essentially coincident, that is, the regions which share closer economic
ties with the less dependent are just the principal sources of the
constituencies supporting the party in power, these regions thereby are able to
impose effective pressures on the government, so the asymmetrical
interdependent power is very likely to come into effect. In a word, unless both
the economic welfare and the political bloc of specific geographical section occupy
the dominant position in a state, their policy stands could hardly be able to
determine the general stands of the state.
There are three
points needed to be stressed in this model. First, the policy choice of the
more dependent government essentially can be considered as the policy choice of
the party in power. The party in power is a dynamic concept, not only
indicating the incumbent, but also the prospective. Obviously, winning the election
is the prerequisite for becoming the party in power, therefore the political
bloc plays a crucial role via election campaign. Second, economic geography and
political bloc are two independent phenomena. Nevertheless, when coming to real
geographical distribution, those two phenomena might be somewhat overlapped,
even coincident.[29]
Moreover, It is just this overlapping at different level that increases the
complication and dynamics of the interaction between economic geography and
political bloc. Third, economic geography can influence political bloc. The
former itself may contribute to the formation of the latter, or engender
changes in it.
Research Methodology in
the Case Study
1.
Qualitative analysis.
Detailed case
studies: Russo-Ukraine Relations and Across Taiwan Strait Relations during the
first decade of 21st century.
Why
are these two cases? Representativeness.
a)
Both these two sets of
relations are asymmetrical economic interdependence: Ukriane’s economy highly
depends on Russia and Taiwain’s economy highly depends on Mainland China.
b)
Both Ukraine and Taiwan
had undergone a series of elections concerning their political relationship
with Russia and Mainland China respectively.
c)
There exist typical
economic geography and political bloc in both Ukraine and Taiwan.
d) In
these two cases, two kinds of economic measures had been or would be utilized. Detailed
analysis of the measures implemented by the less dependent will be fairly
helpful to the integrity of the theoretical model, as economic strategy employed
by the less dependent generally not only includes economic sanctions, but also
economic incentives or the combined one. And I plan not only discuss the
economic actions which had been taken by the state but also the actions which
were planned or threaten to be taken, in this case, the case of Across Taiwan
Strait relations would be potentially useful to the research.
e)
Through detailed
analyzing these cases, I hope the findings could turn to help compensating and
perfecting the above sketch of my theoretical model.
2.
Quantitative analysis.
Data are the
essential section of the case study in this research. The following data are
required for supporting the case analyzing and the theoretical model:
a)
Data which can reflect
the situation of asymmetrical economic interdependence, such as exports and
imports divided by products, foreign direct investment, external debt, and etc.
b)
Data which can reflect
the economic geography of the more dependent.
c)
Data of the elections,
specific to electoral districts.
d) General
statistics of the administrative regions of the more dependent, such as
population, number of voters, GRP (Gross Regional Product), per capita GRP, and
etc.
e)
Data that might reflect
the economic changes in the more dependent brought about by the economic
strategy of the less dependent.
Most of the
above data can be collected from the statistical institutes of specific states
and international organizations (UN, IMF, etc.); the others may be reached in
relevant reports and academic papers.
[1] Literature with
positive perspective, see: Solomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Trade”, The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1980, pp. 55-78; Richard N.
Rosecrance, The rise of the trading state: Commerce and conquest in the
modern world, New York: Basic Books, 1986; John R. Oneal and Bruce N.
Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992”, World Politics,
Vol. 52, No. 1, 1999, pp. 1-37; Erik Gartzke , Quan Li and Charles Boehmer,
“Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict”,
International Organization, Vol. 55, 2001, pp. 391-438. Literature with
negative perspective, see: Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A
Path to peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?”, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1996, pp. 29 - 49。Literature with neutral
perspective, see: Barry Buzan, “Economic Structure and International Security:
The Limits of the Liberal Case”, International Organization, Vol. 38,
No. 4, 1984, pp. 597-624; Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard,
“Commercial Liberalism Under Fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936,” Security
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1996/97, pp. 4-50; Kenneth S. Waltz, “The Myth of
National Interdependence”, In C. P. Kindleberger ed., The Multinational
Corporation, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970.
[2] Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Power and interdependence:
World politics in transition, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, p. 10-11.
[3] David A. Baldwin,
“Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies”, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1979,
p.176.
[4] Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence,
Harper Collins Publishers, 1989, p.11.
[5]
Robert
O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and
Interdependence, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989, p. 11.
[6]
Mark
J. C. Crescenzi, “Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.
65,
No. 3, 2003, pp. 809-832.
[7] 邝艳湘: 《经济相互依赖、退出成本与国家间冲突升级———基于动态博弈模型的理论分析》,载《世界经济与政治》,2010 年第4 期,第131 页。
[8]
R.
Harrison Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political
Influence,” International Organization,
Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988, pp. 461-483.
[9] 加利·克莱德·霍夫鲍尔著,杜涛译: 《反思经济制裁》,上海: 上海人民出版社2011 年版,第9 页。
[10] 加利·克莱德·霍夫鲍尔: 《反思经济制裁》,第129 页。
[11] Richard
N. Haass, ed., Economic Sanctions and
American Diplomacy, New York: Council on Foreign
Relations
Press, 1998, p. 205.
[12] Risa
A. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?” Security Studies, Vol. 11, No.
4,
2002, pp. 1-50.
[13] Richard
N. Haass, ed., Economic Sanctions and
American Diplomacy, p. 203.
[14] Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade, London: MIT
Press/Leuven UP, 1991, p.1.
[15] Peter Trubowitz,
“Political Conflict and Foreign Policy in the United States: A Geographical
Interpretation”, Political Geography,
Vol. 12, No.2, March 1993, pp.121-135.
[16] Paul Krugman, “What’s
new about the new economic geography?” Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, Vol.14, No.2, pp.7-17.
[17] Paul Krugman, “The
New Economic Geography: Where Are We?”, Nov. 26, 2004,
http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Event/Sympo/pdf/krug_summary.pdf
[18] 钟飞腾:《社会行为体政策偏好:国际政治经济学研究的微观基础》,载《世界经济与政治》,2007年第4期,第54-60页。关于国际经济政策的国内政治影响,还可参见迈克尔·J·希斯考克斯:《国际贸易与政治冲突:贸易、联盟与要素流动程度》,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005年5月第1版;Fiona McGillivray, Privileging Industry: The Comparative
Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004, pp.1-72.
[19] Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and
Change in American Foreign Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1998.
[20] Kevin R. Cox, Murray
Low and Jennifer Robinson eds., The Sage
Handbook of Political Geography, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2008,
pp.21-58.
[21] John A. Agnew, Place and Politics in Modern Italy,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002, p.3.
[22] Reference on the
distribution of the political blocs in the United States, see: Nicole Mellow,
Peter Trubowitz, “Red versus blue: American electoral geography and
congressional bipartisanship, 1898-2002”, Political
Geography, Vol.24, No.6, pp.659-677; Charles E. Cook, “The Equilibrium
Election”, The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 25, No.2, 2002, pp.251-256;Reference on the
distribution of the political blocs in Thailand, see: 孔建勋:《当代泰国中产阶层的政治表达和政党倾向》,载《东南亚南亚研究》,2010年第2期,第8-14页;Reference on the situation of the
political blocs in Kyrgyzstan, see: Maxim Ryabkov, “The North–South Cleavage
and Political Support in Kyrgyzstan”, Central
Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.3, 2008, pp.301-316.
[23] Ron Shachar, “Party
Loyalty as Habit Formation”, Journal of
Applied Econometrics, Vol.18, 2003, pp. 251–269.
[24] Kevin Denny and Orla
Doyle, “Does Voting History Matter? Analysing Persistence in Turnout”, American Journal of Political Science,
Vol.53, No.1, 2009, pp.17-35.
[25] For instance, a long
time attention has been paid to this field in American political studies. See:
William G. Jacoby, “The American Voter”, in Jan Leighley, eds., The Oxford Handbook of American Elections
and Political Behavior, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010,
pp.375-396; Michael Lewis-Beck, William Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth and Herbert
Weisberg, The American Voter Revisited,
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008, pp.138-160.
[26] William G. Mayer
proved through quantitative analysis that as a group the swing voter may, when
compared to the rest of the electorate, possess following traits: (1) Swing
voters are less partisan than nonswing voters; (2) Swing voters are more likely
to be moderates, both in general ideology and on specific issues; (3) Swing
voters are less informed about and less interested in politics than nonswing
voters; (4) Swing voters are demographically different from nonswing voters.
See William G. Mayer, The Swing Voter in
American Politics, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008,
pp.1-31.
[27] Besides the dynamics
of political bloc mentioned, there is a sudden movement of political bloc that
appears in the form of “Critical
Elections”, in which large-scale and lasting electoral realignment occurs. See
Chambers and Burham, ed. , The American
Party System : Stages of Political Development, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1975, p. 277.
[28] In fact, cutting off
the existing economic ties such as economic sanctions is not the only vehicle
through which the power of asymmetrical economic interdependence takes effect.
There is still another possible situation, that is, the less dependent takes
the measures of economic incentive, luring the more dependent to accept its
political demands. Nonetheless, the article adopts the vehicle of locking the
economic welfare which derived from the current economic ties alone as the
logical start. Because the government of a state usually would not publicize
the “carrot policy” from other countries actively.
[29] In certain sense, the
disparities among economic geography bring about the geographical disparities
among specific interests, then the geographical disparities among specific
interests produce, via political representation, the geographical disparities
among the political preferences. See Peter Trubowitz, “Political Conflict and
Foreign Policy in the United States: A Geographical Interpretation,” in G. John
Ikenberry ed., American Foreign Policy:
Theoretical Issues, New York: Harper Collins, 1996, pp.395-411.