

## 2021 年度 学術交流支援資金申請書

科目名 地域研究から見るグローバル・ガバナンス  
該当科目・コース アカデミックプロジェクト科目・プロフェッショナルコース  
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研究課題名 小国の政権と外国出資者による資源の独占～ユーラシア及びインド太平洋地域における  
当事国と地域へのインパクト (Resource Capture by Small-Nation Governments and Foreign  
Investors: National and Regional Effects in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific Region)  
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**注** This year's research was not able to arrange ZOOM meetings with relevant informants due to circumstances in their countries and scheduling difficulties. Social media interviews and discussions, as well as secondary research, were the supporting materials.

### 概要

Recent notions of geopolitical and economic spaces have shifted markedly with the rapid emergence of new global threats. In addition to COVID-19, the abrupt political changes in Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific have been accompanied by significant economic impacts throughout the region. The small nations of the region discussed in this research – Azerbaijan and Myanmar – were, even prior to the most recent events, dependent on aid and investment from larger nations, especially those neighboring their territories. As the extent of aid and dependence upon it increased, so did the privatization and capture of strategic resources, as well as the likelihood of monopolization and political instability. This resource capture is for distribution to higher bidders – elites who can pay higher prices – and the resulting uneven development within a nation spreads to its regional partners.

First, while the designation “Eurasia” was often been notional and imprecise, Russia’s advancement of its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and “Greater Eurasian Partnership” was not, and its perceived necessity for resource capture of the types mentioned here followed on to the small governments that authorize foreign-invested energy resource development projects in their territories. Azerbaijan, a small nation in Eurasia in the lynchpin position to extract and deliver energy resources between the Middle East and Southern and Eastern Europe, is vulnerable to such increasing resource capture as a result of increases in government and outside-investor agreements.

Second, the designation “Indo-Pacific,” has gained currency recently as both a general concept and as the indicator of a strategically important economic region (Khurana 2019; Wada 2021). But it is now no longer only a maritime region but also encompasses the Asian continent’s southeast as far inland as China. In terms of trade and of resource extraction, the

nation of Myanmar has recently become an important contributor both to the wider region as well as to its host region, the Upper Mekong. Its recent changes in policy and systems are reflected in sectoral and sub-sectoral shifts in the Upper Mekong economy.

In the case of Myanmar, first, the change back towards the previous form of governance has been seen as affording less transparency in foreign investment and business, causing some foreign corporations to exit while large-country neighbors who have continuously invested for decades may continue with planned projects. These foreign-invested projects include large-scale development projects necessitating large-scale land conversion, especially for water-based energy sources (hydropower), new industrial parks, and export-oriented plantations. Second, the digital connectivity that has helped enable leapfrog development through rapid and secure Internet-based financial transactions was captured for uses by authorized, higher-paying, and government users, as the digital transition became a resource in itself, generating access to other resources for capture. The restriction of information, remunerative communications, Internet banking, and cross-border (international) corporate and SOE financial transactions has augmented the capture of financial resources within complying sectors.

As we have noted in previous years' research, the rapidly expanding connectivity, in terms of both physical and digital infrastructures, has greatly facilitated transactions involving resource investments and resource projects between large countries and their smaller neighbors, as well as increasing the fear and reality of a "debt trap" (Ishida 2019). Now, however, with the political shifts of 2021, though infrastructure development and use have proceeded, the basis and aim of connectivity, that of economic development, has faltered in some of the smaller states.

## II. ファインディング

Rapid resource capture by foreign investors for uses is directly related to, and enhances, the larger investing country's influence over transboundary resources such as rivers, mineral deposits including oil and gas, and intangible digital resources and connectivity. These investments may overlap with the ambitions of smaller countries' ruling elites for restrictive control of access to resources, and over the use of resources themselves. While this has posed an escalating governance problem throughout the two regions of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, it also leads to unequal distribution in the smaller country and poses the more concrete issues of economic repercussions in the wider region. The types of natural and physical capital sought and targeted for monopolistic uses in the two regions consist of:

- Extractive industry resources, especially energy resources from oil, gas, minerals, and water power for industrial use
- Human resources for labor, including low-skilled, skilled, and mobile labor
- Information and communications technologies, broadband platforms, and the Cloud, especially for use in banking, E-commerce, medical services, business, and education. This includes not only restrictions on access, but also manipulation, distortion and exploitation of contents
- Highway and transport infrastructures, and the land converted along them for use in energy capture and transport, for large-scale agribusiness products, and transport or transmission of other resources

In the past year, negative repercussions have become more visible given the political instability and abrupt changes in some of the 2 regions' smaller nations. Since the political change in Myanmar of February 2021, its runaway inflation and rising food and basic needs prices (UN World Food Programme (WFP)). This national effect on the region is seen in its transnational business, particularly in goods transported overland to China and Thailand. The major exports are from the agricultural sector, where rising prices and political instability make sales and overland border transport difficult. China, however, as a major investor in Myanmar's mining, hydropower, and telecom sectors, still posted gains between imports and exports with Myanmar; as Japan's Ministry of Economy and Industry pointed out, China's supply chain is resilient (2021 White Paper) and it can use Myanmar strategically (Byrd 2022). Thailand was reported to be losing a considerable amount in border trade with Myanmar during 2021 (Thai Chamber of Commerce).

In Myanmar's case, though it is tempting to see the political change as one of restricting or shutting down access to resources, the shortages and inflation have re-formulated economic transactions and spaces to include the wider geography of Myanmar's chief investor but fewer consumers. Further, intangible or indirect resources, particularly digital resources, are those that make possible the use or capture of more lucrative resources, especially in banking, commerce, and communications technologies. These resources and their associated hardware have in fact remained available but at much higher prices, both to elites within Myanmar as well as those residents and visitors from its investors, some of whom continue to produce the hardware, software, and electricity for digital resources.

National and regional effects of Myanmar's change were surveyed by the Foreign Chambers of Commerce in Myanmar and by the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business. They showed that the domestic sectors of agriculture, travel, and logistics suffered considerable losses in income, activity and staff; as above, these are the sectors that deal most with China and Thailand. On wages, the UNDP has assumed that wages in the formal sector shrank by 25% to 50%, and that the cross-border remittances, and thus disposable

income within Myanmar, of labor migrants shrank 10% to 20%. Most significant, however, is the finding that the economic downturns in some national and border-trade sectors lead to a vicious circle of greater resource capture by elites: the World Bank's survey found that while "public investment and income support" were felt to be insufficient, there was "increased concessional financing" (2021).

### アゼルバイジャンを焦点するディスカッション（廣瀬陽子）

- 大国からの出資によって揺れる事例、ユーラシアの小国アゼルバイジャンには、① **天然資源**が豊かである離脱した地域には鉱物があり、東部にあるカスピ海内・海岸沿いの石油（原油）とガスおよび本地域からのヨーロッパへのパイプラインがあり(四津啓 2020)、② **必要な労働力**についても、移民・難民の多い地域が現在に争われている地域になり、上述のエネルギー資源によって大国からの出資をうけ迅速に発展している重工業部門のためには、人的資源というリソースを独占するとも思える。

#### 本研究におけるユーラシア地域への応用性

アゼルバイジャン以外の旧独立国家共同体（"former CIS"）の諸国家にも対しては、以前より大国ロシアの圏に属している小国は大国の政治力や経済力の下に置かれていることのみならず、大国も小国も互いに有利な点・恩恵を獲得することは当然だと思える。が、これが地域を不安定化させる傾向もある。**現在ウクライナの情勢**は、（脱退したい州または未承認国になる）国境内二つの地域（ルガンスク、ドネツク）が離脱後に大国は軍事制御をするだけでなく、当地域にある膨大な工業地帯及び炭田、経済的な有利点へも目を向けているといえる。

・上述の**アゼルバイジャン**のように、移民・難民の多い地域が現在に争われて、本国政権及び大国が求めている多くの人的資源つまり重工業団地帯の開発をすすめているための独占できる人的リソースである。

### 結論

The restrictive control of access to resources, which is not necessarily only a deplorable feature or one of nations in turmoil, has in these 2 cases become "resource capture." What became visible in 2021 was the continued stability and often growth in economic sectors within these two representative countries that complied with their governments' resource capture. Meanwhile a downturn in border trade and sea trade of lower-priced goods showed at both national levels and with their trading partners. The political causes and consequences of resource capture in the near term showed as being self-perpetuating or, when balked, possibly leading to vulnerability to invasion as in the case of Ukraine.

### 成果

#### ティースマイヤ・リン

- 1) 学会発表・国際会議での講演 他

- 4.29 WSIS. "Digital Transitions to Digital Despotism: Cyber-Insecurity and its Regional Threat to Connectivity"
6. 26 臨床環境医学会.「パンデミックにおける健康の社会的決定要因(SDH),環境の決定要因～東南アジア調査と国際保健医療との関わり～」
- 7.1 Land Academy (Netherlands). Panel presentation, "Land Mobility, Climate Crisis, and the Governance Trap in Southeast Asia."
- 8.27 International Convention of Asia Scholars (Kyoto). Paper. "The Myanmar Crisis: Effects on Border Economies, Geographical Adjustments, and Supra-national Mobility in the Upper Mekong Region."
- 11.25 International Conference on Cyberlaw, Cybercrime and Cybersecurity (New Delhi). Presentation, "Digital Resource Capture, Disruption, and Growing Economic Disparities in Developing Regions."
- 12.8 Global Forum, Thematic Webinar V, *Digital Transformation in Times of COVID-19*, Presentation "Challenges of transboundary health protocols in ASEAN under COVID-19: Potentials of digital - analogue frameworks on mobility and health"

## 2) 学術論文・査読中

- "Technologies in Transit: Gender, indigenous technologies, and informal migration survival strategies in Southeast Asia" at *Gender, Technology and Development* journal (Asian Institute of Technology)
- "The Myanmar Crisis: Effects on Border Economies, Geographical Adjustments and Supra-national Mobility in the Upper Mekong Region" at *ICAS 12 Conference Proceedings*, April – May 2022.

## 廣瀬陽子

- 2022年2月6日放送 NHK 日曜日討論 「緊迫ウクライナ情勢 事態打開へ各国は」(前半) – 日曜日討論 – [nhk.jp/p/touron/ts/GG149Z2M64/blog/bl/pMlyjkN6AY/bp/pxD6wK5bBR/](https://nhk.jp/p/touron/ts/GG149Z2M64/blog/bl/pMlyjkN6AY/bp/pxD6wK5bBR/)
- 2022年2月19日 「ウクライナ危機、専門家はこう見る。プーチン大統領が得た『5つのお土産』とは？」 HuffPost *World* 2022.2. 20、安藤健二  
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